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Abstract 
This thesis is a literature review that studies Gibrat’s law and the firm dynamics with the help of 
conventional models of industry dynamics. Robert Gibrat formulated one of the first models of 
industry dynamics already in 1931 and in this model he used the assumption of law of proportional 
effect  that  is  today  understood  as  Gibrat’s  law.  A  common  interpretation  of  the  Gibrat’s  law  
presented  in  many articles  is  that  a  firm’s  growth  rate  and  its  size  are  independent  of  each  other.  
This thesis uses this interpretation of the law. Put differently, the law states that small firms grow at 
the same rate as large firms. The power of Gibrat’s law is the primary research question and a 
common theme that is carried throughout this thesis. In addition, this thesis touches briefly on what 
creates firm growth. 
 
In general, the extensive literature has rejected the law, but various studies have found that the law 
is valid for certain subsamples or time periods. Therefore, this thesis argues that the question is not 
whether Gibrat’s law is valid, but rather when and with what restrictions it is valid. This thesis also 
tries to understand why Gibrat’s law should be accepted. One of the aims of this study was to 
identify testable hypothesis that would more accurate. Hence, they would further clarify the role of 
Gibrat’s law.  
 
These questions are studied with help of the theory on firm and industry dynamics. This makes the 
approach more unique as existing studies focuses heavily on empirical testing. As primary material, 
this thesis uses the existing empirical literature on Gibrat’s law and four models of industry 
dynamics by Hopenhayn (1992), Jovanovic (1982), Cooley & Quadrini (2001) and Murto & Terviö 
(2010). Hopenhayn’s model is analyzed more thoroughly than the rest of the industry dynamic 
models. 
 
The conclusion of this study is that in the majority of the cases small firms indeed grow faster than 
large firms. This is supported both by theoretical and empirical evidence. It can be case that 
sometimes the growth is observed as stochastic, but it would seem that the underlying process is 
indeed deterministic as there are profit-maximizing firms that act and make decisions. These 
findings  could  explain  why  sometimes  studies  reject  the  law  and  sometimes  they  accept  it.  
Hopenhayn’s model is a stand-alone model, but it opens the possibility for other models were 
Gibrat’s law could be a special case. Thus, the conclusion is that Gibrat’s law can’t be a valid. The 
three other models that were presented more or less confirmed that the law can’t be valid.  
 
Furthermore, it was possible to find new testable hypothesis. For example Gibrat’s law could be 
tested for an industry where there has been a large increase in cost of entry, preferably over a 
shorter period time. The expected result  is  that  after the increase in cost  of entry,  there should be 
less deviation from Gibrat’s law. Finally, this thesis views that superior productivity creates firm 
growth. 
 
Keywords: Gibrat’s law, firm growth, growth-size relationship, industry dynamics, productivity 
shocks.   
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1 Introduction 
Does size have an impact on growth? Do smaller firms grow faster than larger firms? Overall, what 
stimulates the growth of firms? These are nontrivial questions that have been central in the study of 
industrial economics for a good reason for a long time. Growth has a comprehensive impact on 
different levels. The firm’s shareholders would certainly be interested in knowing what induces 
growth. Also, the growth-size relationship is important from a policy perspective. Substantial 
amount of money and effort is spent on encouraging firms to grow. According to Toivanen et al. 
(2010) Finland invested 3.6 per cent of GDP – €5 billion - on R&D in 2001. In 2009, Tekes 
invested 343 million euro in R&D projects done by firms. 60 % of this funding went to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME)1. If growth were a random process, then it would be questionable 
that the subsidies are targeted on small and medium-sized firms. 
 
The first formal model on industry dynamics and growth was presented already in 1931 by Robert 
Gibrat whom argued that firm growth is independent of firm size2. Put differently, Gibrat stated that 
small firms grow at the same rate as large firms. The power of Gibrat’s law is the primary research 
question and a common theme that is carried throughout this thesis. In general, the extensive 
literature has rejected the law, but various studies have found that the law is valid for certain 
subsamples or time periods. Therefore, this thesis argues that the question is not whether Gibrat’s 
law is valid, but rather when and with what restrictions it is valid. This thesis also tries to 
understand why Gibrat’s law should be accepted. These questions are studied with help of the 
theory on firm and industry dynamics. This makes the approach more unique as existing studies 
focuses heavily on empirical testing. In other words, this thesis is a literature review. 
 
Growth has been studied extensively and various models and frameworks have been presented. This 
thesis focuses on models were selection and firm-level heterogeneity are important factors. In 
addition, in these models the agent’s primary action is profit maximization. Given the assumptions, 
                                               
1 Tekes (teknologian ja innovaatioiden kehittämiskeskus) is a Finnish government official that subsidies firms, 
organizations and universities in R&D-projects. 
2 When discussing firm size, evidently the first step would be to define what is meant by term. However, this is not 
maybe as easy as one might imagine. As Sutton (1997) states “"size" can be measured in a number of ways, and these 
arguments have been variously applied to measures of annual sales, of current employment, and of total assets. Though 
we might in principle expect systematic differences between the several measures, such differences have not been a 
focus of interest in the literature.” In general, this thesis will continue to treat size in a similar manner. One could 
assume that difference between different size measures move in the same direction and using a certain measure changes 
only the distance between the firms and not the order of the firms. Therefore, it is assumed that some kind of universal 
and unique measure exist that defines the firm size unambiguously. However, in certain cases it is assumed that some 
specific measure of size is used. In these cases, the choice of measure is indicated clearly. 
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the model’s different results follow from this profit maximization. These holistic models have been 
defined as the industry dynamics literature3. One of the reasons why this family of models is chosen 
is that they are more conventional economics models. In addition, the models have a strong 
stochastic component. Gibrat has been justly criticized due to the model’s lack of economics and it 
is interesting to see how the results change when economics is combined into a stochastic process. 
The models are also rich in implications and they provide an opportunity to touch on what actually 
creates growth. However, this is not the primary research question and the matter is discussed only 
briefly.   
 
Hopenhayn’s (1992) industry dynamics model is presented as the base case for the holistic and 
more traditional profit-maximizing models. In Hopenhayn’s model there is a continuum of firms 
that produce a homogenous product. Firms can enter the industry once they have paid the cost of 
entry and they will exit once the firm’s value drops below zero. The exogenous productivity shock, 
that follows a Markov process, is the model’s central assumption. The key result is the existence of 
a stationary equilibrium where there is positive entry and exit. The stationary equilibrium is also a 
competitive one, meaning that there is no welfare loss. In Hopenhayn’s model, firms grow because 
they are more productive than their competitors. Also, within the model smaller firms grow faster 
than larger firms. This is due to selection as small firms are more likely to exit. The reason for these 
exits is that small firms that don’t grow fast don’ have incentives to continue in the industry.   
 
Naturally, Hopenhayn’s (1992) model is not perfect and there are some unrealistic assumptions and 
factors that are omitted. Therefore, models that extend or are similar to Hopenhayn’s model are 
presented. Jovanovic’s (1982) model introduces the growth dependency on age and Cooley & 
Quadrini (2001) presents a model where size and age dependencies exist simultaneously. The model 
by Murto & Terviö (2010) is also presented. It is a hybrid of Hopenhayn’s and Cooley & Quadrini’s 
model.  These  models  clarify  the  profit-maximizing  firm’s  central  role  as  the  initial  source  of  all  
results. Hence, the models further strengthen the view that Gibrat’s law should be rejected. For 
example Jovanovic (1982) shows how the model can in certain special cases produce Gibrat-like 
results, but still growth is not random because it is a result of firms maximizing their profits. In 
other words, Gibrat’s law is a special case of more elaborate models of industry dynamics as these 
models  can  explain  Gibrat’s  results,  but  Gibrat’s  model  can’t  replicate  the  results  of  the  different  
industry dynamic models. Based on more elaborate models, new and more specific hypothesis on 
                                               
3 For comparison, the oligopoly strategy is another strand. Check from Sutton (1997) 
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the validity of Gibrat’s law can be formulated and further studied. Some of these hypotheses will be 
presented in the different subsections. 
 
The thesis is organized in the following manner. Section 2 comprehensively presents Gibrat’s law 
including information on how the law has been studied empirically.  Section 3 then presents the 
Hopenhayn’s model as a base case. Section 4 provides alternative explanations for why firm size 
could vary. Section 5 provides concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.  
2 Gibrat’s law 
The study of industrial organization has had a long history and within this field of research one of 
the fundamental questions has been market structure and the relationship between firm size and 
growth. Dynamics has had a central role when exploring the different relationships. This strand of 
industrial organization can be defined as the study of industry dynamics. According to Sutton 
(1997) it was Robert Gibrat that presented the first formal model of the dynamics of firm size and 
industry dynamic. The law of proportional effect and the subsequent model was presented in 
Gibrat’s book, Inégalités Économiques, which was published already in 1931.  
 
This chapter will present Gibrat’s basic model and the implied results. It will also present some of 
the extensions and versions that have been proposed. The aim is to give a coherent and complete 
presentation on the mindset that is embedded into Gibrat’s model and its different variants. Further, 
this chapter explains how Gibrat’s law has been tested and subsequently what should be taken into 
account when testing the law. In general, Gibrat’s law is rejected, but there are also studies that 
would accepted the law at least for a subsample. In addition, there is some ambiguity in what is the 
correct  way  to  test.  Therefore,  the  outcome  of  this  chapter  is  to  conclude  that  the  theory  of  firm  
dynamics should be revisited instead of continuing generically testing the law. Having another look 
at the theory should help clarify why the law could be valid.  
 
2.1 The law of proportional effect and the stochastic firm size 
Gibrat’s  original  work  is  based  on  the  observations  of  skewed  distributions  in  different  areas  of  
economics such as income or plant distributions. Gibrat proposed that the distribution of the firm’s 
size is lognormal and his aim was to give a theoretical and empirical justification for this proposal. 
He further argued that if the variable in question is transformed with an appropriate function, it 
could be shown that the transformation generated a normal distribution. According to Sutton (1997) 
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Gibrat followed the arguments of astronomer Kapteyn, who also had been interested in skewed 
distributions albeit in different environments. Nevertheless, according to Sutton (1997) Gibrat’s 
main argument was that the skewed distribution consisted of a large number of small variables that 
were additive and independent of each other. The skewed distribution could then be converted into 
a normal distribution by transforming the initial variable ? with an appropriate function into a 
variable ?. Gibrat argued that the appropriate function for firm’s size would be a logarithmic 
function. Gibrat tested his proposal with both income and plant size in the manufacturing sector and 
according to Sutton (1997) the goodness of fit was striking.  
 
What today is understood as Gibrat’s law is slightly different from what the original argument was. 
According to Loti et al. (2003) a common interpretation of the Gibrat’s law presented in many 
articles is that a firm’s growth rate and its size are independent of each other. It is good to note that 
this was only an assumption in Gibrat’s model. For the sake of clarity, in this thesis Gibrat’s law 
refers to the common definition that the growth rate is independent of firm size.  
 
Mansfield (1962) presents a concrete example of Gibrat’s law: a firm with sales of $100 million is 
as likely to double in size during a given period as a firm with sales of $100 thousand. Evidently, 
the firm with the $100 million sales will have a higher growth in absolute terms. Similarly, Sutton 
(1997) states that the “expected value of the increment to a firm’s size in each period is proportional 
to the current size of the firm”. It is important to distinguish between absolute and relative growth 
and therefore Gibrat’s law states only that the relative growth is independent of the firm’s size.  
 
2.1.1 A formal presentation of Gibrat’s law and argument 
Gibrat’s model is presented formally using Kalecki’s (1945) presentation as an example. If one 
denotes number of workers at a certain date ?? and assumes that number of workers undergoes a 
series of small random independent proportionate changes ??,??, … ,??, then at the end of the 
period the variable ?? is 
 
1)   ?? = ???1 + ????1 + ???? ?1 + ???.  
 
The assumption that a variable undergoes a series of random independent proportionate changes is 
known as the law of proportional effect. According to Kalecki (1945) the law has been long known 
before Gibrat. As stated above, the distribution of equation 1 will be lognormal and if one wants to 
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transform  the  distribution  into  a  normal  distribution  then  size  has  to  be  studied  on  a  logarithmic  
scale. It is good to note that when Kalecki proves the transformation, the firm size is measured in a 
relative manner with respect to the average market size rather than looking at the firm’s absolute 
size. The result should not be different whether size is measured in relative or absolute manner. It 
only has an impact on how the argument is constructed. Hence, if one would denote ?? as the 
deviation between the logarithm of ?? and  the  mean  of  log?? and if one would denote ??, as 
deviation between ??? (1 + ??) and  the  mean  of  log  (1+mt),  then  the  evolution  of  the  firm’s  
relative size on logarithmic scale could be presented as in equation 2. 
 
2)   ?? = ?? + ?? + ?? + ???  ??  
 
According to Kalecki (1945) it can be shown that “whatever the distributions of ?? at the initial 
date, with the lapse of time the distribution of ?? approaches normality more and more”. The reason 
is that initial deviations’ impact will diminish as time goes by and the distribution of ?? + ?? +
???  ?? will be approximately normal if the standard deviation of different components in the 
sequence have only a small impact on the sequences’ standard deviation4. 
 
In addition to the above, there is couple of other assumptions that are needed in order to ensure that 
Gibrat’s  law  holds.  Rodríguez  et  al.  (2003)  point  out  that  Gibrat  assumes  that  there  is  no  serial  
correlation. This means that the previous disturbance terms don’t have an impact on the current 
disturbance term. If there were positive serial correlation, then past growth would simply generate 
higher growth in the future. Hamilton et al. (2002) note that “the variance, or volatility, of growth 
rates should be constant across all firm sizes for any given sector”. If the variances would be 
different between large and small firms, then naturally it would lead to differences in the growth 
rates5.  
 
Bechetti & Trovatto (2002) state that Gibrat’s law implies that, after controlling industry 
characteristics, the expected growth rates should not be affected by any other variable. Rodríguez et 
al. (2003) makes another interesting point that if the variance of logarithmic firm size increase with 
time, as Gibrat’s law implies, and the number of firms stay constant then the industry concentration 
increases. Finally, Hamilton et al. (2002) point out that Gibrat didn’t define the length of ‘period’ 
                                               
4 According to Kalecki (1945) Laplace-Liapounoff theorem guarantees this, which is a version of central limit theorem. 
5 The variances should be homoscedastic, not heteroscedastic. 
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for when the law of proportional effect was valid. The law could be valid for yearly growth, but as 
well as for growth measured during a decade. This could have implications on testing Gibrat’s law. 
 
Sutton (1997) states that Gibrat's aim was to convince his readers that the lognormal distribution 
and underlying purely stochastic process was a statistical regularity sufficiently sharp to provide a 
basis for serious mathematical modeling. This is what happened as Sutton (1997) continues that 
“during the 1950s and 60s, a substantial class of models appeared which combined “Gibrat’s law” 
with a range of ancillary assumptions”. Similarly Mansfield (1962) noted that Gibrat’s law is a 
basic ingredient in many mathematical models designed to explain the shape of the size distribution 
of firm. Although the law was used in many models, the model was criticized quite early. For 
example when Mansfield (1962) tested Gibrat’s law he rejected it four or seven times out of ten 
depending of different test specifications. 
 
2.1.2 The variants, versions and mindset of Gibrat’s law 
It was already Kalecki (1945) that questioned Gibrat’s model as it had some implications that 
seemed to be unrealistic. According to Kalecki (1945), the main problem is that the standard 
deviation (or variance) of the logarithmic variable increases with time and in many cases such an 
increase is not apparent. Since then, variants or extensions of the Gibrat’s stochastic mindset have 
emerged in order to adjust the model into a more realistic direction. Kalecki himself presented one 
such variant where the variance of the relative logarithmic size was constant, but the size 
distribution remained lognormal6. This is done by assuming a linear negative dependence between 
the logarithms of relative growth and logarithms of relative size. There are also other extensions. 
For example according to Laitinen (1999) “the incorporation of the birth-and-death process in 
Gibrat’s law leads to a Yule distribution when there is a constant rate of birth (Simon’s model) or 
serial correlation between periodic growth rates (Ijiri-Simon’s model)”7. In other words, the exact 
form of the distribution depends on assumptions made. In Gibrat’s original proposal there were no 
“additional” assumptions and distribution was lognormal.  
 
In addition to the different variants of Gibrat’s law, it has been argued that the law is valid only for 
certain subsamples. Currently, three different versions have been identified. The standard version 
assumes that the law holds for all firms in a given industry. This includes also those firms that exit 
                                               
6  Kalecki (1945) also showed that the lognormal distribution could be transformed into a normal distribution given 
certain conditions. 
7 The distributions in the two models refer to the distribution of size, not the transformed distribution. 
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the industry within the study period8. The second version takes into account exit. Mansfield (1962) 
presented that the law should be only valid for firms that have survived. However, in sections 2.2 
and sections 3.3.2 it will be discussed why the second version of Gibrat’s law can never hold as 
small and slow growing firms are more likely to exit and this will result in a nonrandom sample. 
This sample selection bias will be discussed in more detail in the following section. Finally, the 
third version is that Gibrat’s law applies only for larger firms. Formally this means that firm growth 
rate is independent of size only for those firms that have surpassed the level of minimum efficient 
scale (MES). The idea was put forward by Simon and Bonini (1958). 
  
As Laitinen (1999) and Rodríguez et al. (2003) points out, it is essential to note that there is no 
optimal size for the firm in Gibrat’s model and in the different versions, because there is no 
additional benefit from a specific size. This illustrates well the mindset that is embedded into the 
models. The firm’s size is simply a stochastic process. The size evolves randomly over time and this 
leads to a skewed firm distribution. The distribution’s exact form then simply depends on the 
assumptions. In this setting, managers can’t generate additional growth by simply splitting a large 
company into smaller parts and public policies aimed at supporting growth by subsidizing small 
companies would be useless. 
 
Rodríguez et al. (2003) notes that randomness could be generated from several factors that act in 
multiple fashion. They list executives’ aversion to risk and industrial or political trends as possible 
factors favoring expansion in some cases and in others a reduction in size. Goddard et al. (2006) 
note  that  “Gibrat’s  law does  not  preclude  the  possibility  that  ex  post,  strong  growth  performance  
can be attributed to ‘systematic’ factors such as managerial talent, successful innovation, efficient 
organizational structure or favorable shifts in consumer demand”. However, they further state that 
these factors can’t be used to predict which firms grow, because “these factors are themselves 
distributed randomly across firms.” 
 
The logic is that the random variable completely captures the impact of all possible underlying 
factors. In other words, Gibrat has not categorized the different factors or their impact but instead 
assumed that these factors cannot be measured. Therefore, the best estimate for growth is a random 
variable that does not have any relationship with the firm size. In Gibrat’s own empirical studies the 
rough estimate had a striking goodness to fit as Sutton (1997) pointed out, but in many studies, such 
                                               
8  Usually, in empirical studies the proportional growth rate of the firms that exit equals -1. At least according to Lotti et 
al. (2003), it is rather disputable whether this procedure is correct or not. 
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as Mansfield (1962) or Chesher (1979), the results were questioned. The empirical testing of 
Gibrat’s law and the associated problems are the topic of following section.  
 
2.2 How is it studied? 
Gibrat himself originally tested his proposition by looking at the distributions of firm sizes and 
examining  whether  the  distributions  were  lognormal  or  not.  As  pointed  out,  the  results  were  
impressive. After this, there has been an extensive amount of research on Gibrat’s law during the 
past 50 – 60 years. The existing literature focuses mainly on testing the proposition with empirical 
methods. Most of the recent studies reject the law, although the results are not as straightforward as 
one would expect. There has been more diversity in the results as sensitivity analysis has been done. 
For example for certain time periods or for certain industries, studies fail to reject the law. In the 
following sections, the results are presented in more detail.  
 
The past research can be categorized into two different classes. The first continues to test the law 
using Gibrat’s original approach by evaluating a given distribution of firms and accept the law if it 
seems that the distribution is lognormal. Simon & Bonini (1958) and Reichstein & Morten (2006) 
are examples of the first type of research. The second strand studies whether Gibrat’s law is valid or 
not by estimating whether the change is truly stochastic or not. This is usually done by looking at a 
panel of firms. The first strand was the dominating approach during the first 20 or so years. As more 
advanced econometrical methods have been developed, the second strand’s popularity has increased 
considerably. Now, the majority of studies related to Gibrat test whether growth is stochastic or not. 
Examples of these studies will be presented below. 
 
It is not only the development of more advanced methodology that has shifted the attention to the 
latter strand as there is also a principal reason in favor of it.  Namely, a lognormal distribution does 
not guarantee that Gibrat’s law would be valid. Weiss (1998) argues that the power of the first type 
of test is low since the relationship of growth rates to size is not explicitly investigated. Almus & 
Nerlinger (2000) go even further by stating that “testing whether the distribution of firm size is 
approximately log normal is not enough to verify Gibrat’s law”. Therefore, the following 
subsections will concentrate on presenting the results only from the second strand of literature as it 
is more relevant.  
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2.2.1 The foundation 
The ideas put forward in Mansfield (1962) and Chesher’s (1979) seminal paper has evolved into a 
foundation that majority of the studies use as a starting point. Equation 3 presents the methodology 
in its most basic form, the original logarithmic specification of Gibrat’s Law. Size for company ? at 
time ? is presented by ??,?. ?? can be thought as an estimate of average growth rate for the whole 
industry or all firms. ?? is the independent variable’s coefficient that can be estimated for example 
with ordinary least squares (OLS) method9. 
 
3)  log ?? ,? = ?? + ?? log ??,??? + ??,?    
 
According to Lotti et al. (2003) “if both sides of equation 1 [in this thesis it is equation 3] are 
exponentiated, it becomes clear that if ?1 is  equal  to  unity,  then  growth  rate  and  initial  size  are  
independently distributed and Gibrat’s Law is in operation. By contrast, if ?1 < 1 smaller firms 
grow at a systematically higher rate than do their larger counterparts, while the opposite is the case 
if ?1 > 1.” In case large firms would grow faster than smaller firms, it would lead to explosive 
growth. This seems unrealistic at least for a longer period of time.  
 
The primary null hypothesis is that ?? is  1.  In  addition,  there  are  usually  two  additional  null  
hypotheses that are tested. These are the absence of serial correlation and homoscedasticity. 
According to Chesher (1979) failure of any of the three necessary conditions is sufficient to reject 
the  law.  The  statistical  significance  and  the  validity  of  the  null  hypothesis  are  usually  confirmed  
with a t-test or an F-test. Mansfield (1962) used Chi2 for null hypothesis testing. This study will not 
go deeper into the merits of the different methods regarding hypothesis testing as it is not within the 
scope of the study. 
 
Although the foundation seems to be simple, there are major challenges in testing that can have 
impact on the results and therefore they should be taken into account properly. The three major 
challenges are serial-correlation, heteroscedasticity and sample selection bias and they are presented 
in more detail in the following section.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
                                               
9 Equation 3 can be compared to Mansfield’s  (1962) equation 10. 
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2.2.2 Problems relating to empirical testing 
It was already Chesher (1979) that showed how serial correlation can be a problem if there is no 
proper control. He argued that the serial correlation in the disturbance terms “may render least-
squares estimators of ? inconsistent, even though estimation proceeds using cross-sectional data”10.  
According to Dougherty (2002) ”a consistent estimator is one that is bound to give an accurate 
estimate of the population characteristic if the sample is large enough, regardless of the actual 
observations in the sample”. If there is positive serial-correlation meaning that past growth 
generates future growth, then the estimator overstates the estimated variable ?111. The length of the 
time period over which growth is examined, ceteris paribus, has also an impact on the size of 
inconsistency. The overestimation decreases when the length of the period is increased. The main 
trouble is that the null hypothesis is accepted due to serial correlation even though it shouldn’t be.  
 
So it is not only that there shouldn’t be serial-correlation, but if there is serial correlation and it is 
not taken into account properly, then the probability that the law is accepted increases. Chesher 
(1979) proposed equation 4 to control serial correlation where ?? is ??  +  ?, ?? is –??? and ?? is 
the average growth rate of all firms. The null hypothesis is that ?? is 1 and ?? is 012. 
 
4)   log ??,? = ?? + ?? log ??,??? + ?? log ??,??? + ??,?   
 
It is not clear how large an impact serial-correlation has on the results. Wagner (1992) found that 
the serial correlation was significant. Kumar (1985) noted that “there was some persistency in firm 
growth over time, but it was considerably weaker than was found for earlier periods.” In contrast, 
Dunne and Hughes (1994) didn’t find any evidence of serial correlation in their sample. 
                                               
10 According to Chesher (1979) the inconsistency can be derived “under the assumption that the process generating 
company sizes is observed a finite period of time after its commencement and that the parameters of the process remain 
constant as time passes.” In addition, only first order serial correlated disturbance terms are taken into account. 
11 Serial correlation is formally defined in the equations below where ? refers to the disturbance term in equation 3. ? is 
the variable that indicates of the serial correlation and ? is the disturbance term. The ?-values will range between -1 and 
1.  If ? is larger than 0, then there is positive serial correlation and the estimate is overstated and vice versa. 
 
??,? = ?????,? + ??,?  
 
12 Chesher (1979) elaborates that OLS regression to cross-sectional data on ??,? , ????,? and ????,? may be expected to 
yield consistent estimators. Further, the estimates on ? and ? may be obtained from the equation below. However, 
sample information alone will not tell which of the estimates is which on the RHS, but one can assume that ? should be 
close to unity.  
 
   ??? , ??? = ?
?
??? + (??? + 4??)?/?? 
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Nevertheless, serial-correlation can be a problem, as showed above, so it should be controlled in 
order to ensure robust results. 
 
Heteroscedasticity is another issue that should be taken into account. Heteroscedasticity means that 
the disturbance term’s variances are not constant but rather a function of for example size or time. 
According to Evans (1987a) “previous studies have found that the variability of firm growth 
decreases with firm size, which suggests that u [the disturbance term], is not constant across firms”. 
Dunne and Hughes (1994) report that “the source of this heteroscedasticity is often thought to lie in 
the greater stability of larger diversified firms compared to their smaller brethren”, but according to 
them it is not the sole reason for heteroscedasticity. Evans (1987a) supports this view as he points 
out that failure of the heteroscedasticity test may indicate a number of possible problems. 
Nonlinearity is one of Evans (1987a) explanations. 
 
Dunne & Hughes (1994) argues that there is a difference between the managerial talent between 
young and old firms as it would be logical to assume that young firms have less managerial talent 
and thus are more prone to error. Hence, heteroscedasticity could be induced by that large firms are 
typically old and this interdependence could create the differences in the variances.  
 
As stated in the previous section, if Gibrat’s law were too accepted, then there should be no 
heteroscedasticity. However, if there is no control for heteroscedasticity then there is a risk of a 
false positive meaning that the null hypothesis is accepted even though it shouldn’t be. There are 
two reasons why heteroscedasticity causes false positives in standard OLS regression. The first is 
that the estimators of the standard errors of the regression coefficients will be wrong rendering the 
hypothesis testing invalid. In addition, heteroscedasticity causes inefficiency in the OLS estimators. 
Efficiency is a measure of reliability meaning that on average an efficient estimator gives more 
accurate results than an inefficient estimator.  
 
According to Dougherty (2002) the magnitude of the problem depends on the nature of the 
heteroscedasticity and there are no general rules. He presents an example where the OLS estimated 
coefficient is doubled when there is no proper control for heteroscedasticity and in addition standard 
errors of the OLS estimator are underestimated13. The results on heteroscedasticity are varying. 
                                               
13 In the example the standard deviation is proportional to independent variable and the result has been estimated using 
OLS technique.  Even though the disturbance term is argued to be decreasing in size by various studies such as Evans 
(1987a), the given example shows that heteroscedasticity can be a major problem if not properly taken into account. 
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Evans (1987a) didn’t find results on heteroscedasticity, but Hall (1987) on the other hand found 
evidence of heteroscedasticity. Wing & Yiu (1996) found that heteroscedasticity was significant.  
 
As presented above, heteroscedasticity can be a problem, but fortunately there are ways to control 
it. The control proposed by White (1980) is used by majority of the studies. According to 
Dougherty (2002) ”White (1980) demonstrated that a consistent estimator of ??????
?  [the variance of 
estimated coefficient when OLS] is obtained if the squared residual in observation ? is used as an 
estimator of ???
?  [The variance of the disturbance term in ?].” In other words, the control ensures that 
the t-statistic used for null hypothesis testing is accurate for large samples. Even though White’s test 
can make the estimator’s variance consistent, the OLS estimator(s) remains inefficient.  
 
The final major problem is the sample selection bias. This issue was already mentioned in section 
2.1.1, but it is covered here, in the following section and in section 3.3.2 in more detail as the issue 
is rather important. The main problem is how to treat firms that exit during the examination period. 
Mansfield (1962) was the first one to bring up this issue. He actually found out that there was a 
clear difference in results when only remaining firms were included into the dataset. Mansfield 
rejected Gibrat’s law in 70 % of the studied industries when he tested the standard version, but 
when he tested the law on only surviving firms the rejection percentage had decreased to 40 %14. 
Even though the amount of industries where the law is accepted increased, Mansfield rejects the law 
in general, because the OLS regression shows that the ?? does equal unity in half of the cases. The 
intuition why the second version should always be rejected is presented in section 3.3.2.  
   
Firms that exit wouldn’t be a problem if the number of firms that exit would be evenly distributed. 
However, if exit is not evenly distributed and for example small or young firms exit more 
frequently than large or old firms, then there will  be problems when there are no proper controls.  
Lotti et al. (2003) sum up that “if survival is not independent of firm’s initial size – that is, if 
smaller firms are more likely to exit than their larger counterparts – the empirical test can be 
affected by a sample selection bias and estimates must take account of this possibility.“ They 
further point out that the sample selection bias naturally applies in particular to new and small 
firms, for which the hazard rate is generally high. The overrepresentation of small and fast-growing 
                                               
14 Mansfield (1962) tested the law first by classifying firms by their initial size and computing the frequency 
distribution  of  growth  rate  within  each  of  these  classes.  He  then  uses  a  ?2 test to determine whether the frequency 
distributions are the same in each class. 
 
13 
 
firms is not the main cause for sample selection bias. The real issue is that due to some other 
determinant the sample includes also some small and slow growing firms. These other determinants 
are captured by the disturbance term leading to correlation between the dependable variable and the 
disturbance term. In other words, it is the classical omitted variable bias. 
 
In other words, the essential question is whether small firms are more likely to exit. The evidence is 
in favor that this would be case, but there are some results that contradict this. Evans (1987a,) found 
“the positive relationship between survival and size holds for 81 percent of the industries and the 
positive relationship between survival and age holds for 83 percent of the industries”. Dunne & 
Hughes (1994) have similar findings as Evans, but they note that the relationship between firm size 
and death rate is  not as straightforward as it  seems. As a matter of fact,  Dunne & Hughes (1994) 
find that the relationship is U-shaped rather than a linear one. Audretsch et al (1999) didn’t find any 
evidence on small firms exiting with a higher probability. Calvo (2006) states that “there are big 
differences in size between those firms that survived and those that did not: the mean size of the 
surviving firms is four times that of those that closed”. 
 
The non-surviving small firms are not the only reason for sample selection bias. As Hall (1987) 
points out “some of the most rapidly growing and successful small firms may not be present at the 
beginning of the period, which will produce biases in the other direction”. In other words, there are 
considerable incentives to control for sample selection bias and naturally there are many ways to do 
so. The approach presented by Hall (1987) and Evans (1987 a, b) has been favored by many studies.  
The three studies use a sample selection model which belongs to the Tobit model family. The model 
will be explained in the next section. 
 
2.2.3 The Tobit models and multivariate models 
In the “foundation” -approach presented above, the firms that didn’t survive were given an arbitrary 
growth rate such as -1 or were left  out of the sample depending on which version of Gibrat’s law 
was studied. Exiting firms can be studied more elaborately. According to Verbeek (2008), Tobit 
models are used to study processes where the dependent variable is continuous, but its range may be 
constrained and “most commonly this occurs when the dependent variable is zero for a substantial 
part of the population, but positive (with many different outcomes) for the rest of the population”. 
In the case of Gibrat’s law, Tobit models are used to model the survival of firms in order to test and 
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correct for sample selection bias15. Intuitively this means that in the Tobit model the impact of the 
non-surviving firms is attempted to estimate more analytically rather than setting bluntly the growth 
rate at -1. According to Dougherty (2002) a Tobit model consists of two components, which are a 
probit model and a standard regression. 
 
For the sake of simplicity, the probit model is explained first as a standalone component. In a probit 
model, a dependent binary choice / variable that takes the value of either 1 or 0 is studied. The aim 
is to estimate what factors have an impact on the occurrence of the binary dependable variable.  
Equation 5 illustrates, where ?* is the binary variable and ? are the estimated coefficients16. 
 
5)    ??? = ?? + ??? = 1         ?? ?? > 0 ?? = 0         ?? ?? < 0  
 
In the case of Gibrat’s law, the binary variable would naturally be firm survival. The starting point 
is to estimate a linear function of the variables that determine the probability of the choice. An 
example of such a function could be equation 3. The binary variable is then estimated by fitting the 
data to a standardized cumulative normal distribution17. According to Dougherty (2002) “maximum 
likelihood analysis is used to obtain estimates of the parameters”.  
 
In a Tobit model, the probit analysis is used to analyze a latent variable ???. The difference between 
a Tobit model and a probit model is that the latent variable (i.e. the dependent variable estimated by 
the probit model) can also take other values than 1 and more importantly the latent variable is used 
in further analysis according to Verbeek (2008). As stated above, there are many different variants 
of the Tobit model. The key difference between a standard Tobit model and a sample selection 
model is on what basis an individual observation is included into the sample. In the former variant, 
sometimes  denoted  a  type  I  Tobit  model,  the  selection  is  based  on  the  same  principle  as  the  
regression itself is done. In the latter model, the sample selection model, the selection, as the name 
implies, is (partially) separate from the regression model. The sample selection model is the one 
used in the studies performed by Hall (1987) and Evans (1987 a, b) as they assume that the survival 
                                               
15  According to Verbeek (2008) there seems to be a strong belief that a Tobit model could eliminate sample selection 
bias, but this is certainly not generally true. 
16 ?* also known as the latent variable, 
17  In a logit model, the linear function is fitted to a logistic function. 
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process is different from the growth process. Therefore, it is discussed in more detail. The model is 
presented formally in equation 6.  
 
6)    ??? = ?? + ????? + ?????? = ?? + ????? + ???                    ??  = ??? , ?? = 1         ?? ?? > 0 ??  ?? ??? ????????, ?? = 0         ?? ?? ? 0  
 
In equation 6, the latent variable is represented by ???.  This  is  unobserved  and  as  stated  it  is  
estimated with the probit model. In Hall (1987) the latent variable is estimated using the function of 
firm characteristics such as industry or beginning of period size. Evans’ (1987 a, b) latent variable 
can be thought of as the value of remaining in business in excess of opportunity cost. The latent 
variable is thus used to select the appropriate sample. The observation is included into the sample if 
the latent variable is estimated to be over 0. ?? is then the actual variable that is studied and in both 
Hall and Evans ? is the growth rate. ?? is the observable growth rate and ??? is the estimated growth 
rate18. 
 
There  are  two  possible  ways  to  perform  a  type  II  Tobit  regression.  In  the  Heckman  two-step  
procedure, first the latent variable is estimated with a probit model in order to study whether the 
observations should be included or excluded into the sample. The following step is to perform a 
regression on the remaining sample (i.e. for those that ?* > 0).  However, if the regression is simply 
done on the selected observations, then the estimates will be inconsistent, because according to 
Dougherty (2002) the expected value of ?1i is nonzero for observations in the selected sample if ?1i 
and ?2i are correlated. Fortunately, the exact expected value can be deduced analytically and it is 
presented in equation 7, where ??1i?2i is the population covariance between ?1i and  ?2i,  ??1i is the 
standard deviation of ?1i and  ?i is the inverse Mill’s ratio19. According to Dougherty (2002), the 
sample selection bias using only the selected observations can be thought of as an omitted variable 
bias, with the ? being the omitted variable. Naturally, this will lead to that ? will appear in the 
disturbance term creating a correlation between the disturbance term and the independent variable.  
 
                                               
18 The standard Tobit Mode / type I Tobit model is a special case of the type II Tobit model where yi = zi. 
19 The inverse Mill’s ratio, ?i,  is   
 
      ?? = ?(??)?(??) 
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7)  ? ????|??? > ? ?? ? ?????? = ?????????? ??  
 
The correct way to take this omitted variable bias into account is by adding the result of equation 7 
as an explanatory variable to the regression equation ??? = ?? + ????? + ???. It is good to note that 
the omitted variable can always be calculated as the needed inputs to calculate the variable depend 
only on the selection process. The Heckman two-step procedure will lead to consistent estimates.  
 
The  second  possible  way  to  estimate  a  type  II  Tobit  model  is  to  perform  a  maximum  likelihood  
analysis. According Verbeek (2008) both methods will produce a consistent estimator, but the two-
step  procedure  will  not  be  efficient.  However,  some caution  should  be  used  when using  a  type  II  
Tobit model. Verbeek (2008) notes that “routinely computed OLS standard errors are incorrect, 
unless the covariance is 0”. Another issue is that if the independent variables would be the same 
both in the selection equation and in the regression model then there would be a problem. 
Dougherty (2002) states that at least one selection variable should not be in the regression model. 
Finally, he also points that if the selection variable is unjustly added in the OLS regression it can 
have a significant impact even if it shouldn’t20. 
 
In addition to introducing a new framework to test Gibrat’s law, Evans (1987 a, b) also used a new 
linear function in the Tobit estimation instead of the one presented in equation 3. The novel factor 
was to introduce age as a possible explanatory variable for the dependent variable21. The theoretical 
justification that age could have an impact is given by Jovanovic (1982) whose model is presented 
in section 4.1. Evans’s linear function used in the Tobit estimation is presented in equation 8 where 
?? stands for age, ?? for size, ?? for number of plants and ? is disturbance term22. Evans estimates 
the growth function ? by taking a second-order expansion in the logs. Hall (1987) used size as the 
independent variable. Another noteworthy point is that instead of estimating the relationship 
between the current periods and previous period size, Evans (1987 a, b) and Hall (1987) regressed 
the linear function directly on growth. 
 
8)  
??? ??? ? ?? ??  ?
?
= ln???? ,?? ,??? + ??   
                                               
20 I.e. the coefficient would be nonzero when it should be zero. 
21 Number of plants was also considered as a factor, but it was dropped because preliminary results found it 
insignificant. 
22 This was the planned equation, before the preliminary results. 
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Evans (1987 a) studied 20,000 manufacturing firms and Evans (1987 b) studied the firms in the 
Small  Business  Data  Base  “which  was  constructed  by  the  Office  of  Advocacy  of  the  U.S.  Small  
Business Administration (SBA) from information originally collected by Dun and Bradstreet for its 
credit reports”.  Both of Evans’ studies start from 1976 and ends at 1982. Hall’s (1987) two datasets 
consist of publicly traded manufacturing firms. The first dataset contains all firms with employment 
data from 1972 to 1979 and the second dataset extends from 1976 to 1983. In total 962 firms were 
in both samples.  
 
All three studies clearly reject Gibrat’s law. Evans (1987 a) clarifies that ”the negative relationship 
between growth and size holds for 89 percent of the industries and the negative relationship 
between growth and age holds for 76 percent of the industries”. Hall (1987) states that “with respect 
to the size-growth relationship, we have negative results in the sense that neither measurement error 
(serial correlation) in employment nor sample attrition can account for the negative coefficient on 
firm size in the growth rate equation.” Both of Evans’ studies found that “the departures from 
Gibrat's law tend to decrease with firm size.” 
 
Hall (1987) didn’t find evidence that would suggest serial correlation. Evans didn’t treat the matter 
in either of the studies. Also, heteroscedasticity was studied and Evans (1987 b) found results that 
would imply of heteroscedasticity, but controlled it with White’s test23.   Evans  (1987 a)  and  Hall  
(1987) didn’t find the heteroscedasticity to be significant, but nevertheless controlled it with 
White’s  test.  As  stated  above,  all  the  studies  used  the  type  II  Tobit  model  to  correct  for  sample  
selection bias. All three studies found that the firm size had an impact on the survival. 
 
Multivariate models have become a standard after Hall’s (1987) and Evans’ (1987 a, b) studies. 
Also  other  potential  explanatory  variables  have  been  introduced.  For  example  Hamilton  et  al.  
(2002) studied a multivariate model where legal form was one of the additional variables24. Dunne 
& Hughes (1994), Wing & Yiu (1996) and Rodriguez et al. (2003) found a negative relationship 
between age and firm size, but in Hamilton et al. (2002) the results were more mixed.  Bechetti & 
Trovatto (2002) found some evidence that finance has an impact, but the magnitude of the results 
                                               
23 White test checks that the residual variance of a variable in a regression model is homoscedasticity. 
24 Hamilton et al. (2002) found that legal form had impact. For example publicly traded firms grew faster than private 
firms. Hamilton et al. (2002 suggest that “this result is the outcome of capital constraints faced by private firms, as well 
as their bias against high-risk initiatives where they face unlimited liability.” 
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vary depending on whether non-surviving firms are included or not. Johansson (2005) found that 
the effect of government ownership is insignificantly negative in all regressions, but Wing & Yiu 
(1996) found that government ownership had a role. 
 
To sum up, Evans (1987 a, b) and Hall (1987) were the first studies that took sample selection bias 
into account. The studies have had a significant impact on the study of Gibrat’s Law. Evans (1987 
a) states himself that “the major contribution made here is to test Gibrat's law for theoretically 
relevant samples of firms after controlling for sample censoring.”  In addition, new independent 
variables were introduced. Naturally, new testing methodology has been introduced after the three 
studies.  One example is  the different panel tests.  However,  this will  study will  not go deeper into 
these new methodologies. 
 
2.3 A critical look on the testing and results 
In  general,  the  empirical  studies  reject  Gibrat’s  law,  but  the  rejection  is  not  as  unanimous  as  one  
would expect. In other words, there are also studies that contradict the general rejection of the 
Gibrat’s law, at least for some subsamples. One example of such studies is done by Vander Vennet 
(2001) who studies the growth of national banking sectors in the OECD countries. Although 
Gibrat’s law relates to firm size, Vander Vennet (2001) argues ”that the evolution of individual 
banks  will  to  a  large  extent  be  determined  by  the  economic  and  regulatory  environment  of  their  
home country.”25  
 
The study is performed using the OLS method following the specification of Mansfield-Chesher 
studies. In other words, equation 4 is used to test and therefore serial-correlation is taken into 
account. There is no need to take sample selection bias into account as all the national banking 
sectors are included. The study starts from 1985 and ends in 1994. For this period, Gibrat’s law is 
rejected. The study is then split into two sub-periods. The first one covers the years from 1985 to 
1989 and the second study covers years 1990 – 1994. For the former, Gibrat’s law is rejected, but 
during the second period the law is accepted.  
 
There are other studies on the financial sector such as Goddard et al. (2002) that studied the credit 
union sector in US and found rather diverse results. In general they reject Gibrat’s law, except when 
                                               
25 Vander Vennet (2001) continues that “this is especially true in terms of the available strategic options in areas such as 
functional de-specialization, degree of internationalization, access to funding and capital. Therefore the evolution of 
aggregate national bank sectors in the OECD area is analyzed” 
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they estimate the growth of total memberships using panel testing techniques. Nevertheless, 
Goddard et al. (2002) found that for univariate models Gibrat’s law is accepted in some periods. 
Actually for the multivariate models Goddard et al. (2002) found that “in general larger credit 
unions grew faster than their smaller counterparts, and that there is a positive relationship between 
size and age.” irrespective of whether the estimation was done using OLS or panel techniques. 
Interestingly, Das (1995) found a negative relationship between growth and size, but a positive one 
between age and growth when studying the computer hardware industry in India. 
 
It is interesting how the result for the same industry can fluctuate with different time periods. 
Vander Vennet (2001) noted that he studied the different time periods separately because a series of 
major deregulation initiatives were implemented at the end of the 1980s. It is likely that this 
changed the results26. The result would imply that institutions and regulations could have an impact 
on whether firm size has impact on the growth rate. Findings by Audretsch et al. (1999) support this 
view as they report that “there is virtually no evidence to link firm size with survival” in a study on 
Italian manufacturing. Their result contradicts earlier studies for other countries such as Germany, 
United Kingdom and the United States. The reason they present is that the underdeveloped and 
highly imperfect Italian capital market entails barriers to entry which lead to “a pre-entry selection 
process which selects only those characterized by the choice of more capital intensive production 
techniques, techniques, larger availability of internal finance and easier access to outside 
financing.“ To sum up, institutions, regulations and other tacit factors have impact on the results. 
 
Also, business cycles could be a possible explanation why the results vary over time. Hardwick & 
Adams (2002) report that “for example, small firms may tend to grow faster than larger firms 
during an economic boom (as experienced by the UK at the end of the 1980s) in response to greater 
consumer confidence and higher spending”. With respect to the business cycle and institution 
aspect, it is good to keep in mind that Gibrat didn’t specify for what time period the law is 
applicable and hence there are a variety of different time periods to be used. In general, a ten year 
span  is  used,  but  there  are  also  studies  that  have  a  longer  time  span  than  this.  For  example  
Mazzucato (2003) studies Gibrat’s law over a 30 year time span and found that the law describes 
the statistical process of firm growth better in the early phase of industry evolution in the auto and 
                                               
26  Vander Vennet (2001) continues “examples include interest rate deregulation, liberalization of capital flows and a 
harmonization of bank capital requirements initiated by the Basle Committee”. 
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PC industry27.  Furthermore,  he finds that in the later phases the firm growth rates tend to be more 
stable and structured, which would imply that the law should be rejected. 
 
In addition to the three major challenges in testing Gibrat’s law presented earlier, there are still 
challenges  that  need  to  be  taken  into  account.  Size  is  one  such  example.  The  original  study  
performed by Gibrat used the number of employees as a measure for size. Naturally, there is quite a 
variety  of  different  size  measures  and  it  doesn’t  seem  that  one  leading  measure  would  have  
emerged. Rodriguez et al. (2003) for example test the law using total net assets, operating income, 
added value and equity as measures of size. However, the measure of size also seems to depend on 
the industry in question. The studies on the financial sector, such as Vander Vennet (2001), seem to 
favor the total assets as a proxy for the size. Johnasson’s (2004) study on Swedish IT follows the 
original line of Gibrat by using employment as the measure. Wing & Yiu (1996) also used 
employment as a measure in a study on Chinese manufacturing firms.  
 
Johansson (2004) rejects Gibrat’s law as null hypothesis, but Wing & Yiu (1996) actually fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that ?? in equation 3’s is 1 and the null hypothesis that there is serial 
correlation when measuring firm size in terms of number of employee. They state that “this 
suggests that the employment growth of firms in the current period is on average independent of the 
employment growth in the last period.” What is interesting is that Wing & Yu (1996) actually reject 
the same hypothesis when they use output as their measure of size. However, they reject the 
Gibrat’s law in whole because both measures show that there is heteroscedasticity. But it is 
interesting that a simple change of measure can alter the results in such a drastic manner.  
 
Unfortunately, size is a non-trivial matter. For example, the third version of Gibrat’s law states that 
the law is only valid for a subsample of firms that have a surpassed a level of minimum efficient 
scale (MES). The reason for this could be in the relationship between survival and firm size. 
Audretsch et al (2004) state that “as long as the likelihood of survival is also independent of firm 
size, Gibrat’s law would be expected to hold for a reasonably large sample”. One could argue that 
for firms that have surpassed the MES-level the link between survival and size doesn’t exist 
anymore which will lead to a Gibrat-like growth pattern. This would imply that small firms are 
mean-reverting if they are under the MES-level. However, if the likelihood of survival would be 
linked to a certain specific measure, then the testing of Gibrat’s law could go wrong simply by 
                                               
27 Mazzucato (2003) defines the first 30 years as the early phase of industry evolution. 
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choosing the wrong measure. Furthermore, in study on farm size, Weiss (1998) found that there 
could actually be two scale-thresholds. Therefore, it can be the case that it is not enough to only 
study the subsample of firms that are over the MES-threshold as “medium-sized” firms converge to 
the second threshold. 
 
Heshmati (2001) studied Swedish micro and small firms in the region of Gävleborg during 1993 to 
199828.   The  data  was  not  split  into  sub-periods,  but  what  makes  the  study  interesting  is  that  the  
results are very sensitive to functional form and estimation methods of the panel technique.  Sample 
selection  bias  is  taken  into  account  in  all  different  methods  by  adding  the  inverse  Mill’s  ratio  as  
suggested in section 2.2.3. Gibrat’s law is rejected using the OLS method. In addition, Heshmati 
(2001) rejects OLS as a method as there is considerable firm-level heterogeneity and it would lead 
to either over- or understatements. Instead a multi-step generalized least square (GLS) estimation 
procedure is used. He finds that the growth-size relationship is negative when using the 
“employment model” and positive when using the “sales model”, respectively. Heshmati (2001) 
notes  that,  in  general,  employment  growth  model  are  found to  be  more  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  
functional form and estimation method of the panel technique29. 
 
In other words, there are a quite many ways to test Gibrat’s law and it is not 100 % clear that what 
the correct way is. It is likely that sample selection bias is present and this would be in favor of 
Tobit models. However, Verbeek (2008) noted that Tobit models may not be adequate to correct for 
sample selection bias. On the other hand, according to Goddard et al. (2002) panel techniques 
should be in favor of cross-sectional  regression because the cross sectional regression suffers from 
a loss of power. As stated above, Heshmati (2001) also favors panel techniques. However, the panel 
techniques also have their limitations, namely the lack of proper data. This means that there is a 
lack of longitudinal data sets tracking the evolution of firms. In addition, there is some ambiguity 
regarding which panel test actually should be used as Heshmati (2001) reports different results for 
the fixed effects model and the random effects model. Given all the challenges presented in this 
section, the following section presents a new way to look at the matter. 
 
                                               
28 According to Heshmati (2001) these firms have employees between 1and 100. 
29 Difference can be created by treating the disturbance term differently. Heshmati (2001) elaborates that there are two 
types of model which are the fixed effects (FE) model, where the disturbance term is assumed to be fixed and correlated 
with the explanatory variables, and second, the random effects (RE) model, where disturbance term is assumed to be 
random and not correlated with the explanatory variables. 
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2.4 The next step? 
As stated before, the literature on testing Gibrat’s law is rather extensive as it covers various time 
periods and different industries. In addition, the law has been tested with various methods and 
different datasets. The general result is that Gibrat’s law can’t be a “law” in general or in a strict 
sense, but there also some mixed evidence. There have been time periods and industries when 
Gibrat’s law is accepted. Audretsch et al. (2004) sum up that in general for larger firms Gibrat’s law 
tend to be valid and Evans (1987 a, b) similarly reports that deviations from the law are smaller for 
larger firms. It is not only the size of the firm, but also the general business cycle can have some 
impact on the results. The question is not whether Gibrat’s law is valid or not, but rather when and 
with what restrictions is it valid. 
 
As reported in the previous section, for example, Vander Vennet (2001) found that Gibrat’s law was 
valid in a sub-period after capital markets were deregulated and as stated Vandet Vennet’s study is 
not the only one indicating that sometimes the law should be accepted. Also, the sample selection 
bias and the exclusion of the very smallest firms can have an impact. As discussed in section 2.3, 
the actual methodology of the empirical test can also have an impact on the results. Given all these 
challenges in empirical testing and the fact that there is already a substantial amount of literature, 
this  thesis  proposes  that  rather  than  empirically  testing  Gibrat’s  law,  a  step  backwards  should  be  
taken and the theoretical framework and mindset on firm growth should be studied in more detail.  
 
It is the hope that by analyzing theoretical models and searching for theoretical justifications, cases 
and scenarios could be found and pointed out that would support Gibrat’s law. A concrete aim of 
revising the firm growth’s theoretical framework is that more specific testable hypotheses could be 
formulated rather than the traditional null hypotheses. The different and more specific hypotheses 
could then be one by one falsified by further testing with preferably different empirical methods to 
ensure  more  robust  results.  Also,  there  is  the  additional  benefit  that  other  variables  that  have  an  
impact on growth could identify as by-product of this structured analysis. 
 
2.4.1 Possible reasons to reject Gibrat’s law 
The empirical studies have presented various theoretical reasons to reject Gibrat’s law. One of the 
most popular explanations is that smaller firms are better at innovating. Hamilton et al. (2002) sum 
up that “one explanation commonly put forward for the finding of faster growth of small firms is 
that they have a greater capacity to innovate at least in specific technological environments”. 
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Basically,  this  is  the  Schumpeter  Mark  1  argument,  which  argues  that  SME’s  are  more  likely  to  
provide the bulk part of innovations. Also, as discussed the size question is interdependent with the 
age question, as young firms tend to be smaller. Moreno & Casillas (2007) present the argument 
that  in  general  young,  and  hence  small  firms,  are  not  only  better  to  innovate,  but  also  more  
proactive and less risk averse than older firms. Their argument is that risk taking and pro-activity is 
the very essence of young firms as it provides the opportunity to exist and thrive. 
 
Calvo (2006) finds that both product and process innovating firms have grown more than non-
innovating firms. If it is indeed that innovations leads to growth and small firms innovate, then this 
would explain why Gibrat’s law should always be rejected. It also would mean that if a subsample 
were studied, consist of non-innovating and large firms, it could be the case that Gibrat’s law would 
be valid for this sample. On the other hand, according to Schumpeter Mark 2 small firms wouldn’t 
involve themselves in many R&D projects as it is very costly for SMEs to finance it. In addition, it 
has been noted that large firms have the alternavite to diversify risk over many R&D projects. 
Consistent with this view, Evangelista et al. (1998) found that innovation is more prevalent in large 
firms in a study on large European firms. However, the statistics don’t tell everything as according 
to  Ortega-Argilés  et  al.  (2010)  small  firms  carry  out  informal  R&D.  In  addition,  Van  Dijk  et  al.  
(1997) have found that small firms tend to produce more patents and innovations than larger firms 
by  unit  of  input  invested  in  R&D.  To sum up,  there  is  seems to  be  ambiguity  what  is  the  role  of  
innovation for different types of firms. 
 
Moreno & Casillas (2007) further continue their argument that in general young and small firms are 
more flexible and thus they have less rigid routines. It is the flexibility that enables the firm to find 
and to create new growth opportunities.  This relates to another topic that explains why large firms 
grow at a slower pace. The theory is that larger firms have higher agency costs. This idea is not new 
as according to Hamilton et al. (2002) it was already Penrose (1959) that argued that difference in 
growth rates were present due to differences in internal resources and notably the existent of 
diseconomies of scale in managerial coordination as the organizations grow. This means that the 
ability to allocate resources within the firm decreases with the size and the complexity of the 
organizations. Similarly, Wing & Yiu (1996) presents the idea of structural inertia that explains 
“how the internal organizational structure interacts with the environment.” This leads to that older 
and larger firms are slower to change, because these changes can undermine their accountability 
and reliability. In other words, large firms want to manage their reputation more carefully as they 
have more to lose from a possible downfall. 
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Dunne & Hughes (1994) argue that large firms grow slower, because they are more diversified and 
thus more prone to more variable growth rates leading to decreased overall growth rate. On the 
other hand, reasons why small firms would grow slower can also be identified. Moreno & Casillas 
(2007) state that most of the studies on growth report that “small and medium-sized firms consider 
that the accessibility to sufficient financial sources is either a handicap or a brake to growth”. 
Finally, Hamilton et al. (2002) note that large firms require large absolute growth in order to keep 
their growth rates constant. They give an example that “10% growth for a $4 million company 
requires $400,000 in expanded markets, while a $4 billion firm would need to secure a new market 
of $400 million – an exponentially more difficult task”. 
 
2.4.2 The introduction of the holistic approach 
The above reasons have certainly an impact on the growth and are valid reasons why small firms 
could grow faster. However, they are in a sense scattered as they can’t be (easily) extrapolated into 
general rules that would more strictly define when Gibrat’s law is valid. The role of innovation is a 
good example as there were many factors both in favor and against that small firms benefit from 
innovation and hence grow faster. It was argued in section 2.3 that Gibrat’s law should be accepted 
for  larger  firms  that  have  surpassed  the  MES  threshold.  However,  this  is  not  always  the  case  as  
there are many studies done solely on large firms with different methodologies that reject the law. 
The results vary from industry to industry. A tractable and structured framework would help to 
identify all the relevant factors and clarify Gibrat’s law in more detail. One idea could be that if 
certain industry characteristics that supports the law could be indentify with the help of a theoretical 
framework, then one could test only these industries? The finance sector could be an example 
industry. 
 
Also it is good to remember that although there seems to be a statistical relationship between firm 
growth and size, it doesn’t necessarily mean that small firms grow fast, because they are small. It 
could be very well the case that (small) size is simply a proxy for something else. Stam (2010) notes 
that the statistical relationship “does not necessarily improve our insight into the role of growth 
processes  and  strategies  for  firm  growth,  as  firm  size  and  firm  age  can  be  indicators  for  multiple  
mechanisms (e.g., economies of scale, learning effects, reputation effects)”. This encourages 
studying the growth of the firm in a more analytical manner as one could more easily identify cases 
when size is only a proxy.  
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There are certainly many different frameworks and models to analyze Gibrat’s law and growth, but 
a logical step would be to analyze the problem in a more traditional economics framework. As 
Weiss (1998) notes that “two facts about this model are remarkable: its parsimony and its lack of 
economics”. In other words, a traditional maximizing framework should be presented. Actually, this 
is what happened as new maximizing models were introduced. According to Sutton (1997) “the aim 
was to move instead to a program of introducing stochastic elements into conventional maximizing 
models”30. Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992) and Ericson & Pakes (1995) represent these new 
types of industry dynamic models. This strand of literature looks at firms, and subsequently at 
growth, in a more holistic manner by incorporating the growth question into the profit maximization 
problem. In other words, the evolution of firms’ size is not a standalone process or phenomena, but 
rather a result of firms optimizing their production.  
 
Firm-level heterogeneity, entry and exit are other common features that have an important role in 
these models. Stochasticity is used to impose the firm-level heterogeneity. In other words, the 
randomness that was central in Gibrat’s law is now only a part of a larger model. Selection is a 
common theme in these models as according to Armington & Acs (2004) all these models suggest 
that firm growth rates results from the effects of “noisy” selection and incomplete information.  
 
Although there are a lot in common between the new type models of industry dynamics, 
Hopenhayn’s (1992) model is able to capture many of those essentials improvements in a tractable 
manner. The modeling of the random element is also close to the mindset of Gibrat’s law although 
there are some different assumptions namely on the persistence of the growth. Nonetheless, 
Hopenhayn’s model will be presented as a base case for the new models of industry dynamics in the 
next chapter. Extensions to Hopenhayn’s model and other similar models are then presented in 
chapter 4. 
 
                                               
30 However, Sutton (1997) argues that stating that the earlier models were "not maximizing models" is misplaced. He 
continues that “what is striking about the "stochastic growth models" is not their lack of "optimizing agents," but their 
reliance on Gibrat's Law”. Nonetheless, this thesis makes a clear distinction between the model similar to Gibrat’s and 
the  new  type  of  models  of  industry  dynamics.  There  are  two  reasons.  This  thesis’  focus  has  been  on  the  original  
Gibrat’s law and not on the extensions that are more complicated. Secondly, as will be seen in chapters 3 and 4, there 
are large structural differences between the two model types such as non-existing production optimization in the strand 
of stochastic models. 
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3 Firm-level heterogeneity, entry and exit 
The aim of this chapter is to give a comprehensive presentation on Hopenhayn’s model in “Entry, 
exit, and firm dynamics in the long run equilibrium” in order to justify why Gibrat’s law can’t be 
valid and further elaborate what creates growth. This chapter is divided in the following manner. 
First,  the  assumptions  and  the  model  are  presented.  After  this,  the  competitive  and  stationary  
equilibriums are discussed and what are the implications of the model. Finally, a critical view on the 
model and a path for the future analysis are presented. 
 
3.1 The description of the model 
In Hopenhayn’s (1992) industry dynamics model, there is a continuum of firms that produce a 
homogenous product in a competitive market. It is assumed that labor is the only input of the firm 
although the model can be easily extended to cover multiple inputs. In addition, an exogenous 
shock, ?, defines how productive the firm is. The shock is the only source of uncertainty in the 
model and it follows a Markov process independent across firms with conditional distribution 
????|??. The shock has a crucial role in the model and it will be discussed in more detail in the 
coming paragraphs. 
   
Time is discrete and the incumbent firm has two possible actions in each period. Before observing 
the productivity shock, the incumbent firm can either exit the industry or it can decide to continue 
and produce. It is good to note that the output decision is made after the shock is revealed and thus 
the uncertainty is resolved for that period. The inverse demand function gives the aggregate demand 
and it is assumed to satisfy general conditions (e.g. demand is strictly decreasing, continuous). 
Picture 1 illustrates what actions and events take place during one time period and in what order. 
 
 
Picture 1 - The incumbent firm's actions and events during one period 
 
Productivity
shock realized
( Entry) 
Exit decision Output decision 
and production
Exit decision
One time period
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3.1.1 Exogenous productivity shock as the source of firm-level heterogeneity 
The size of the productivity shock is normalized to be on an interval between zero and one. 
Naturally, a higher productivity shocks is better for the firm. As stated above, the productivity 
shock will have a significant role in the model as the shock will be the main factor that explains 
why firm’s size fluctuates. An intuitive interpretation would be that the shock reflects different skill 
levels. What does it then mean that the shock follows a Markov process independent across firms? 
First  of  all,  the  shocks  are  firm specific  meaning  that  firm’s  shock  has  only  direct  impact  on  the  
firm itself and consequently firm’s realized shock doesn’t alter others’ productivity. A common 
definition  of  a  Markov  process  is  that  it  is  a  process  that  has  the  property  that  given  the  current  
realizations, future realizations are independent of the past31. This basically means that current 
information / situation / level is the only that matters when forming the expectations. However, it 
doesn’t  mean  that  history  wouldn’t  have  an  impact.  The  correct  interpretation  is  that  Markov  
processes are path independent meaning that it doesn’t matter how the productivity level is reached 
if the levels are the same. Usually, the Markov process is assumed because it is much easier to treat 
from a mathematical point of view and it is a fairly good generalization.   
 
Hopenhayn further assumes that ?, the conditional distribution of the productivity shock, is strictly 
decreasing in ?. Hopenhayn interpret that this means that the higher the productivity shock in 
period ? the more likely are higher shocks in period ? + 1. According to Harris & Li (2010) this 
implies that productivity levels are persistent. In other words, there is some level of serial-correlation. 
This assumption is a direct contradiction to the implied assumption in Gibrat’s law, where there was no 
serial correlation. That said, the level of serial correlation is not specified and Hopenhayn’s model does 
not assume that the productivity shock will stay high / low for certain. There are fluctuations and 
the shock can evolve almost without boundaries32. Hopenhayn simply assumes that is more likely 
that the shock stays roughly the same. The persistence of the productivity shock will have a 
considerable role as will be discussed in the results-section. 
 
Picture 2 presents a possible path for the productivity shock ?. In the example, the firm gets a good 
start and the productivity start to increase. This development continues for few periods, but then 
something happens and in period 4 for some unknown reason the productivity is lower than in the 
previous period. How could one justify this sort of productivity path? One possibility is learning by 
doing, where the firm gets better the more it produces. Some firms are simply better at learning and 
                                               
31 See for example Stokey & Lucas (1989). 
32 The shock is restricted to be between zero and one.  
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evolve faster. But what would explain the drop in the productivity, that occurred at t = 4 in the 
example below? Learning by doing can’t explain this and Hopenhayn itself doesn’t provide an 
intuitive reasoning for productivity shock. The exogenous productivity shock just exists. 
 
 
Picture 2 - An example of productivity shock evolution 
 
Normally, a Markov process implies that the future would be impossible to predict. This is true on 
firm-level, but Hopenhayn argues that on aggregate level this is not true.  To the contrary, the 
aggregate output, the employment, the prices, and the frequency distribution will be deterministic, 
because “the frequency distribution for the idiosyncratic shocks each period coincides with the 
probability distribution dictated by the initial distribution, the conditional distribution function, and 
the entry and exit rules” and in addition there is no other source for aggregate uncertainty33. In other 
words, the path for example for the aggregate output and the employment are known. This is also 
true for both the input and the output price and firms can therefore make decision based on perfect 
foresight.  
 
3.1.2 The rationale of exit 
Although the productivity shock is persistent, eventually the productivity will fall below such a 
level that firm has to carefully scrutinize whether is wise to continue or not. This fall will be 
                                               
33 According to Hopenhayn (1992) the fact that “there are a large number of firms and since the conditional distribution 
function F and the probability measure v over initial states are the same for all firms” guarantees this. 
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 Time
?
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inevitable, because it is assumed that the life span of the firm is almost surely finite. The 
assumption is certainly realistic as it hard to come up with examples of firms that would have 
operated forever. The exit decision will be made before observing the next period’s productivity 
shock and it is optimal for the firm to exit when the productivity shock goes below the reservation 
value for the first time. According to Hopenhayn, firms form the reservation rule in the same 
manner, but each firm will have their own optimal reservation value. The reservation value is the 
value  of  the  productivity  shock  when  the  expected  value  of  the  firm  is  zero  and  thus  the  firm  is  
indifferent between continuing and exiting. In other words, the exit decision is an endogenous result 
as the firm will exit when expected value of the firm will turn negative for the first time. Therefore, 
according to Aw et al. (2001) the exits are concentrated among the firms with the lowest 
productivity. 
  
The reservation rule is not static, but instead firms constantly update their expectations when new 
information is revealed (i.e. when they observe their new productivity shock). It is good to note that 
the  value  of  the  firm  is  the  expected  sum  of  all  the  returns  (profits  and  losses)  from  the  periods  
when the firm operates. In other words, there can be periods when the firm makes a loss and still 
continues to operate in industry. Hence, a loss in one period is not a sufficient condition to exit. 
This result seems to be realistic as many firms can have consecutive years of losses and still 
continue to operate. The reason behind this result will be discussed in section 3.3.3.  
 
One final note on exit, the firm has three different cost types, which are entry, variable and fixed 
costs. The variable costs are costs that arise from used labor, but the link between entry and fixed 
costs is more fascinating. The entry cost is nonrecoverable and thus sunk after entry. It won’t have 
an  impact  on  the  production  decisions.  The  firm  has  to  pay  the  fixed  cost  each  period  and  
Hopenhayn justify the fixed costs by the fixed outside opportunity cost for some resources such as 
managerial ability. The fixed costs are significant for the model as Hopenhayn notes that they are a 
prerequisite for exit. If there were no fixed costs, the firm could continue as long as the marginal 
cost would be lower than prices and stop production for those periods when it isn’t. Fixed costs in 
each period create the pressure to perform and if the profit can’t cover the fixed costs, the firm will 
exit. 
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3.1.3 Firm’s objective and entry 
Given the assumptions on productivity, optimal exit and different costs, the firm’s objective is then 
to maximize the expected discounted profits. All the different components are represented in 
equation 9. It is the functional or bellman equation that is an essential part of dynamic programming 
problems34.  
 
9)   ????, ?? = ??? ????,?? ,??? + ???? ?0,????????, ???(??? ,?)??  
 
In the equation, ? stands for profit and it is determined by the productivity shock ?, the input and 
the output prices in the given period, ??  and ??. The second component of equation 9 is the 
expected value function, where ?? is the price sequence (??, ??). The value function is a concept 
that simplifies infinite-time horizon models. It is a representation of all the future profits functions 
after the current period35. The function is calculated given the next period’s shock, ?’, and the 
deterministic price sequence ?. The agent in question has to decide only how much is allocated 
between the current and the next period. The discount factor, ?, represents the preferences between 
different time periods.  In Hopenhayn’s model, the value function is an expectation and not an 
absolute value, because the productivity shock is a random variable. Therefore, one has to integrate 
over the whole conditional distribution ?. 
 
The maximization between zero and the expected firm’s value simply represent that the firm has the 
option  to  exit.  The  zero  value  is  the  normalized  outside  opportunity  cost.  If  one  relates  this  
normalization back to the discussion on optimal exit, the link between the reservation value, exit 
and outside opportunity (i.e. fixed costs) becomes clearer. The reservation rule was the value of the 
productivity shock when the firm’s expected value is zero. The reason for this formalization is that 
the opportunity cost is normalized to zero. If the opportunity cost would be something different, this 
also would be reflected on the reservation value. For example if the opportunity cost increases, the 
reservation value would also increase. Intuitively this means that the firm evaluates between two 
alternatives and chooses the one that have a higher pay-off. 
 
The firm tries to maximize the expected discounted profits, but as said it will inevitably exit. An 
incumbent’s exit will not necessarily lead to that the aggregate output level decreases as entry is a 
                                               
34 See for example Stokey & Lucas (1989) for more information on dynamic programming and recursive methods. 
35 One can envisage the value function as a sum of the all profit functions after the current period. In other words, it 
gives the future value of the firm as the name implies. 
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possibility in the model in each period. Similarly, replacing failing incumbents is not the only 
reason for new firms to enter the market. In other words, actual amount of incumbents can fluctuate. 
One interesting result in Hopenhayn’s model is that the entry and exit will be equal in the steady 
state. It is good to note that entry and exit are not an exogenous process. To the contrary, they are 
endogenous. Aw, Chung & Roberts (2003) states that “the endogenous variables produced by the 
model are the flow of entrants into the market in each period and the minimum level of productivity 
required for incumbents to stay in the market” 
 
If the firm wants to enter the industry, it has to pay the nonrecoverable entry cost. After paying the 
cost,  the  initial  productivity  shock  will  be  revealed  for  the  entrant.  Put  differently,  the  entry  will  
happen before the actual productivity shock is known represented by the dotted line in picture 1. 
After the entry, the new firm behaves like an incumbent firm. According to Hopenhayn new firms 
will enter the market until expected discounted profit net of the entry costs is zero. The entry 
decision is not static as entry is a possibility in each period. 
 
The evolution and the state of the industry can be described by the measure ? over firms’ shocks. It 
describes how the industry has evolved and how many firms there are given a measure. Equation 10 
describe the industry evolution measure in more detail. 
10)   ????(?0,???) = ? ????|???????? + ?????(??)
????
  
The first component on the right hand side describes the state for the incumbent firms. The idea is 
to calculate how many firms are in a given productivity shock range in the next period and sum 
them up. ???? is  the  mass  of  new  entrants  and  ? is the distribution for the initial productivity 
shock. Therefore, the second component describes the state for entrants. This concludes the 
description on structure of the Hopenhayn’s model.  
 
It goes without saying that Hopenhayn’s model is far more elaborate than the one presented by 
Gibrat. The whole starting point is entirely different as the main action is the individual firm’s profit 
maximization. Gibrat’s model was justly criticized due its lack of economics, but presenting a set of 
nice assumptions and a model does not equal economics. Proving that the equilibrium exist is just 
as essential as presenting the model. Therefore to complete the model from an economics 
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perspective and to highlight the difference between Hopenhayn and Gibrat, the equilibrium’s 
existence is discussed rigorously in the following section. 
 
3.2 The equilibrium 
As stated in the previous section, the incumbent firm has to decide whether to continue or not in the 
start of the each period. If the firm decides to continue it also has to decide how much to produce 
given the aggregate demand and input prices. The problem repeats itself in each period the firm 
continues to operate. In other words, the model is formed in a recursive manner. As an extra layer to 
the  exit  and  production  decisions,  there  is  the  aspect  of  possible  new entry  and  the  infinite  time-
horizon. Given the problems complexity, a good starting to point is to define the conditions for the 
different equilibriums. 
 
3.2.1 The conditions for competitive and stationary equilibrium 
Hopenhayn defines four conditions for the industry’s competitive equilibrium that consists of 
bounded sequences of all variables, formally (???,???,???,???,???,???? ???). The competitive 
equilibrium is the traditional concept of equilibrium where there exists a market clearing price. 
Evidently, the first condition for a competitive equilibrium is that there exist such prices that clear 
the  market.  This  should  be  true  both  for  the  input  and  the  output  markets.  The  second  condition  
stipulates that exit rule is chosen optimally. Intuitively these conditions transforms to the idea that 
the incumbent firms behave rationally. In concrete terms this would mean that the firms don’t waste 
resources. For example the firms produce the correct amount of goods compared to the given 
demand. Another example could be that the incumbent wouldn’t prolong its stay in industry, but 
rather exit as soon as the reservation value is hit. The smallness of each firm and the fact that the 
idiosyncratic shocks aggregates to deterministic variables are critical background assumptions that 
ensures that equilibrium exists.  
 
The third condition is that the possible entrants behave rationally and that there are no further 
incentives to enter the industry. Put differently, this means that new firms will continue to enter as 
long as the expected discounted profit net of the entry costs is zero and after this there is no further 
entry in that period. To sum up the incumbent firms’ and entrants’ optimal behavior, the fourth and 
final condition is that the industry state measure should behave consistently with respect to the 
optimal entry and exit rules and initial firm distribution. The industry state measure was described 
in equation 10. The last condition is a sort of a sanity check condition. 
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It goes without saying that the conditions described above have to be valid in each period. It can’t 
be the case that the firm behaves irrationally in one period and in one period it is rational. In other 
words,  both  the  incumbent  and  the  entrant  have  to  be  consistent.  The  period-to-period  optimality  
will then form the competitive equilibrium. The competitive equilibrium is a necessary condition 
for the stationary equilibrium which is the “equilibrium” for the industry evolution. This means that 
the four conditions specified above must also hold in the stationary equilibrium, but in addition 
Hopenhayn defines the stationary equilibrium as a vector (?*, ?*, ?*, ?*, ?*, ?*, ?*) where the 
different elements are the steady states for the bounded sequence in the competitive equilibrium. It 
is good to note that time-subscripts have been dropped in the definition of stationary equilibrium.  
 
Put differently, stationary equilibrium is the state where the firm distribution is constant and steady. 
For example if there is no variation in the amount firms in the industry or in the quantity produced, 
then the equilibrium is stationary. That said, it doesn’t mean that the industry is populated by the 
same firms after the steady state is reached. Actually, what Hopenhayn shows is that it is possible to 
have stationary equilibrium with positive entry and exit given certain conditions. The amount of 
firms is unchanged, but the actual firms changes. Evidently, this must be true as Hopenhayn has 
assumed that the firm’s life-span is finite and hence the productivity will fall for all firms at some 
point below the reservation rule.  
 
The problem is complex from a mathematical point of view, but fortunately there are solution 
methods to study the model in more tractable form. One of the applicable methods is dynamic 
programming as the model is formed in a recursive manner and the time-horizon is infinite. In the 
following sections the equilibrium will be characterized both from the social planner’s and the 
individual firms’ point of view. Looking at the model from different aspects will be important in the 
results section. 
 
3.2.2 The social planner as the agent 
The sequence problem is described in equation 11. According to Hopenhayn the equilibria in the 
model maximize the net discounted surplus. The objective function, that represents the surplus, 
consists of four different components. The two first components are revenue, ?(??), and variable 
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costs, ?(??)36.  The  other  components  are  the  entry  and  the  fixed  costs  adjusted  by  the  amount  of  
relevant agents. Surplus is then discounted and summed up. The feasibility correspondence ?(?) 
restricts alternatives. The correspondence is defined as the set of all sequences ???,??? that comply 
with the optimal entry and exit rules and the firms’ production capabilities. The purpose of the 
feasibility constraint is to restrict the social planner so that she can’t choose such a sequence that the 
firm’s couldn’t execute. It is assumed that the feasibility correspondence??(?) is closed, convex and 
non-empty. 
 
11)  
 ???? = max
?? ,??????????? ? ????? ?  ???? ? ?????????
???
?. ?.
??? ,??? ? ?(??)  
 
 
 
 
Equation 9 presented the firm’s problem in a functional equation form. As equation 11 presents the 
sequence problem from the social planner’s perspective a new functional equation is needed. 
Hence, equation 12 presents the problem in functional equation from the social planner’s 
perspective. The additional benefit of introducing the functional equation from the social planner’s 
perspective is that it creates extra clarity and thus makes the equilibriums’ analysis more structured. 
12)  ???? = max??,????(?)???,?, ?? + ??(??)   
The return function ?(?,?, ?) represents the objective function in equation 11 for one period. 
Intuitively, this is the net consumer surplus. The industry state measure ? is the state variable and ?’ 
is the next period’s industry state. It can be assumed that the measure is well-defined. The control 
variables are the input and output quantities, ? and ? respectively. The value function is 
represented by ???)37. The time subscripts are dropped, because the variables refer only to one time-
period. It is good to note that from the social planner’s point of view there is no uncertainty as the 
                                               
36 The revenue function is defined as R(Qt) = ? ??????
??
?
 and the variable cost function is defined as C(Nt) = 
? ??????
??
?
. 
37 Similar to section 3.1.3, the value function is the sum of all return functions after the first periods. In other words, it is  
a representation of the total surplus after the current period. 
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productivity shock is independent and identical-distributed across firms. Hence, all the aggregate 
variables are deterministic as explained in the section 3.1.1.  
 
The return function is bounded and continuous and therefore it is natural to assume that the function 
belongs to space of continuous bounded functions. Then according to Stokey & Lucas (1989) it is 
enough to show that correspondence is nonempty, compact-valued and continuous and that the 
return function is bounded and continuous. Evidently, the return function satisfies the requirements 
given the topology of the correspondence. Hopenhayn further assumes that correspondence is 
compact and he shows that the feasibility is nonempty. Finally, it can be assumed that feasibility 
constraint is continuous as the output and input variables, ?? and ??, for the individual firms are 
continuous38. There is no reason to assume that the variables will be discontinuous when they will 
be aggregated. Hence by Stokey & Lucas’ (1989) theorem 4.6 the dynamic programming problem 
will have a unique solution. According to Hopenhayn this “implies a dynamical system on the space 
of bounded positive measures given by µt+1 = H(µt) where H is a nonlinear map”.  
 
3.2.3 Equilibrium and the firms as decision makers 
The above proves that a unique equilibrium exists and it was proven from the social planner’s 
perspective. However, the existence of a unique equilibrium can also be proved when the individual 
firm is the agent. The two approaches will have the same solution and in section 3.3.1 it is discussed 
what actually this implies. The second approach is preferred by Hopenhayn as it more useful in 
characterizing the results.  
 
The four conditions for a competitive equilibrium are utilized when proving the stationary 
equilibrium from the individual firm’s perspective. The reason is that the conditions have to be 
valid also in the stationary equilibrium as explained in section 3.2.1. The first step is to prove that 
there exists market clearing prices that are constant. It can then be showed that the incumbent’s 
problem presented in equation 9 has a stationary solution given the constant market prices. In other 
words, incumbents solve the following equation39. 
 
                                               
38  In addition, Hopenhayn’s lemma 1 should be valid. This is a condition that the state measure and price vector 
converge to steady values.  
39 Equation 13 is a variant of equation 9 where the time subscripts are dropped due to the stationary equilibrium and 
where the price vector is presented through a function of µ in order to impose the stationary solution. 
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13)  ???, ?? =  ???, ?? + ??? ?0,?????? , ???????|???  
 
It can be shown that Equation 13 has a unique solution by applying standard dynamic programming 
arguments40. Once it has been established that there are market clearing prices and that the value of 
the firm can be calculated, the following step is to show that the three other conditions are met. This 
is done by introducing three equations that satisfy the conditions and the value function, which 
ensures the market clearing prices. 
 
14)  ?????, ???????|?? = 0  
15)  ????, ??????? = ??   
 
16)  ? = ???,?? = ??? + ??   
 
Equation 14 and 15 represent the exit and entry conditions, respectively. Equation 16 is a variant of 
equation 10 where ?(?,?) is an invariant measure for exit rule ? and entry mass ?. ?? is  a  
bounded linear operator that can be thought as an indicator function that specifies which 
productivity shock levels should included in the calculation of the measure41. The subscripts define 
what the actual cut-off level is and in equation 16 the cut-off point is defined as the optimal exit 
threshold. Put differently, ?? is another way to state that only those firms should be included in the 
calculation of the state of the industry that has a productivity shock above the optimal exit threshold 
level. 
 
The invariant measure ? is well-defined and jointly continuous. In addition, the measure is 
decreasing in ? and increasing in ?. Intuitively this means that the more there is the entry (i.e. 
higher ?) and the lower exit rule ? is, the more firms should there be in the industry. ??(?) is 
defined as the mass of entrants when the exit rule is optimal given for a fixed exit rule. 
Correspondingly ??(?) is  defined  as  the  mass  of  entrants  when there  are  no  further  incentives  to  
                                               
40 It is good to note that the equation has a stochastic element as the productivity shock is a random variable. Therefore, 
the line of arguments presented for the deterministic case in section 3.2.2 can’t be replicated as such. 
41 Formally, the Px is defined as 
  
                                                               ????,?? = ?? ????|??? ??? ? ? 0 ?????????? 
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enter the industry given an exit  rule.  Both ??and ?? are well-defined and they are deduced from 
equation 14, 15 and 16.  In other words, the measures ?? and ?? contain only those points that 
satisfy the equations above42. According to Hopenhayn a stationary equilibrium exists with positive 
entry and exits if there is an x* ? (0,  1]  such  that  ????? = ??(?). In order to clarify the above, 
picture 3 presents the measures in a graphical manner.  
 
  
Picture 3 - Existence of stationary equilibrium taken from Hopenhayn (1992) 
 
At x = 1, ?? will always be higher than ??. ?? should be thought as the amount of entrants needed 
to  replace  the  incumbents  that  exit  in  order  to  hold  the  exit  rule  optimal  (i.e.  to  ensure  that  the  
distribution of firms stays stationary). At x = 1 all incumbents will exit the industry and there are 
not enough entrants to replace the mass departure, because the cost of entry is too high with the 
respect to the productivity requirement. Put differently, there is a mismatch between the possible 
optimal entry and the needed entry to hold the firm size constant. 
 
Hence there are two possibilities i) ?? and ?? will cross at some point and ii) ?? is always above 
??. In alternative i) a stationary equilibrium exists albeit it may not be unique. In the second 
alternative there will be no stationary equilibrium if there is positive entry. However, it can be 
shown that if there is no entry then a stationary equilibrium exists. Naturally this means that there is 
zero  entry  and  exit  and  the  incumbents  remain  in  the  industry  forever.  In  case  i)  there  will  be  a  
                                               
42 As an example ?1(?) is defined as the ? and ? points that satisfy the following equation 
  
?????,?(?,??(?)??????|?? = 0 
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unique stationary equilibrium if the functions crossed just once. According to Hopenhayn, ?? is 
strictly increasing and ?? is nondecreasing meaning that if the cost of entry is low enough it can 
only be the case that the measures crosses only once. These attributes rely on the past assumption 
and proposition made in the model. 
 
Hopenhayn also shows that if the profit function is not increasing in ?, then there will be multiple 
equilibriums. This is Hopenhayn’s assumption A.2b, but he further argues that one of the following 
conditions is necessary for it to hold. The first condition is that that if the industry is a price taker in 
the input markets (condition U.1). The second condition is that if the profit function is separable 
into productivity shock component and price component (condition U.2)43. The first condition 
guarantees that the firm can always benefit from an increase in productivity. The following example 
could be considered. If the output prices were not fixed then it could result in a situation where the 
firm would like to increase production, but it will not do so, because the input prices could increase 
to be too high. According to Hopenhayn the condition U.2 will be satisfied if the production 
function is for example homogenous of degree one in the vector of inputs and shocks. So, the 
condition U.2 basically means that if firms can choose the production input ratios independent of 
the productivity then the production will be increasing in ?. In addition to condition U.1 and U.2, 
there has to be an upper limit on the cost of entry. If there were no such limit, a situation could exist 
where the cost of entry would be too high which effectively deters entry. 
 
Hopenhayn sums up that “the existence of a stationary equilibrium with positive entry and exit is 
equivalent to the existence of a stopping rule with finite expectations and a mass of entrants such 
that for the (stationary) prices correspond to the associated invariant distribution this stopping rule 
is optimal and the expected discounted profits of entrants are equal to the cost of entry”. In other 
words, from the firm’s perspective the problem is an optimal stopping problem. If it can stop 
optimally  and  there  are  enough  entrants  to  replace  the  incumbents  that  exit,  then  there  will  be  a  
stationary equilibrium. One of the results is that the firm’s growth rate will be decreasing in size. 
This negative relationship between firm size and growth rate is a contradiction to Gibrat’s law. This 
and other results will be discussed in the next section.  
 
                                               
43 Formally condition U.2 is ???, p, w) = h(?)g(p, w). 
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3.3 Results 
Few words  should  be  said  on  the  comparison  between Hopenhayn and  Gibrat  as  it  now has  been  
verified that the Hopenhayn’s model is a functioning economics model. First of all, the main 
difference is that in Hopenhayn’s model firms make decisions on production, entry and exit and the 
different outcomes are a result of these decisions while in Gibrat’s model the firms just existed and, 
bluntly said, something just occurred and this result in growth or not. With Hopenhayn’s model, it 
can be verified that the outcomes are result of firms making decisions and this is a nontrivial result. 
The power of the Hopenhayn’s model is considerably larger than Gibrat, because of it can take a 
stand in multiple issues. One such issue is the role of social welfare that couldn’t be verified in the 
models that had the mindset of Gibrat’s law. Welfare is discussed in the following section among 
other things. 
 
Also, Hopenhayn’s model shows that there exists a stationary equilibrium with positive entry and 
exit. What makes Hopenhayn’s work different and robust from the preceding literature is that the 
entry and exit are part of the limiting behavior of the industry given that certain conditions are met. 
For example in Jovanovic (1982) exit and entry is only part of the adjustment to a steady sate. The 
results are obtained by assuming firm-level heterogeneity through serially-correlated productivity 
shocks. Similarly, it is a nontrivial result that entry and exit is part of a stationary equilibrium. It has 
interesting results on for example used resources. 
 
3.3.1 Resources reallocation and price taking firms 
Positive entry in stationary equilibrium existed when entrants had the incentives to replace all the 
incumbents that exit. This occurred at point ?* in picture 3. As explained in section 3.1.2, it is the 
firms with low productivity that exit the industry. To the contrary, the new firms’ actual 
productivity is not known a priori to entrance. In some case, some entrant’s realized productivity is 
higher than the incumbents that exit and similarly for some entrants the realized productivity is 
lower. It is only known that the expected value of the entrant is equal to the cost of entry (for the 
marginal entrant). Naturally, the low productivity entrants will be replaced in the next period, but it 
is good to highlight that the high productivity entrants do not change the aggregate productivity. 
The reason is that in a stationary equilibrium in addition to firm size distribution also aggregate 
output, input, prices are constant.   
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Although entry doesn’t directly change the aggregate productivity, it still has an impact on the 
aggregate productivity. The comparative statistics of the entry costs illustrates the importance of 
entry. Hopenhayn (1992) shows that if the cost of entry increases, it implies that the marginal 
reservation rule ?* and the mass of entrants will decrease. Formally, this means that the ??-curve 
shifts downwards as an increase in entry costs will raise the level of discounted profits needed to 
make entry profitable for each reservation value level. It goes without saying that this discourages 
entry. For the incumbent, the cost of entry is sunk and therefore ??-curve will remain unchanged. 
However, this doesn’t mean that the changes in cost of entry don’t have an impact on the 
incumbents. To the opposite, an increase in cost of entry implies less selection which means that 
low-productivity firms will continue longer in the industry. 
 
According to Aw et al. (2003) decreased entry “makes it easier for low-productivity incumbents to 
survive, reduces the amount of exit, and results in an industry characterized by a higher proportion 
of low-productivity producers”. Assuming that the input prices are constant, then output prices 
increases with cost of entry resulting in higher employment and output for each ?44. This is the price 
effect according Hopenhayn (1992) which ensures that high productive firms can produce more. 
However, this higher price level has an opposite effect. Balasubramanian & Sivadasan (2009) 
elaborates “more specifically, the larger the sunk entry costs, the greater should the expected value 
function be, which requires a higher average price level to prevail in equilibrium. The higher 
average price level allows some relatively inefficient firms to cover their fixed costs”. This is 
defined as the selection effect.  
 
According to Hopenhayn (1992) the “strength of each of these effects depends on properties of the 
stochastic process for the shocks and the production function”. What is clear that the required 
productivity for the marginal incumbent will be lower if cost of entry increases. The expected 
lifetime of firms will be also higher. Higher cost of entry will also lead to a lower turnover rate, the 
rate between entrants and total number of firms. The level of aggregate productivity is ambiguous 
depending how the different components are specified. Thus, the level of entry has an indirect 
impact on the level of aggregate productivity. 
 
                                               
44 The reason is that cost of entry decreases leads to a decrease in the mass of entry. This in turn will lead to that the 
output prices will increase, because if it doesn’t then the aggregate output will grow without bound. 
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However, it doesn’t mean that the production levels, given a cost of entry, were not socially 
optimal. In other words, there is no welfare loss. The social planner couldn’t do no better than the 
“invisible hand”. The solution method presented in 3.2.2 where the social planner maximizes net 
discounted surplus will end up to the same result as when the incumbents or entrants independent 
from any central guidance maximized their own expected discounted profits. The latter case was 
presented in section 3.2.3. According to Bergin & Bernhardt (2008) the standard approach 
characterizing industry dynamics is to show first that the competitive equilibrium corresponds to the 
solution of a social planner’s problem, and then solve the social planner’s problem. The stationary 
equilibrium is then a special case of a competitive equilibrium in the sense that the different 
variables are constants. Stationary equilibrium thus preserves the properties of a competitive 
equilibrium. 
 
What is truly remarkable is that there is no loss from a welfare perspective although there is firm-
level heterogeneity, entry and exit. Evidently, information is imperfect as this is a requirement to 
have firm-level heterogeneity. If there were no uncertainty, only the best would enter resulting in 
identical firms. The reason why entry is needed is that it resolves the uncertainty. As Cabral (2007) 
states  “the  only  way  to  determine  a  firm’s  efficiency  is  to  actually  enter  the  industry”.  Although  
there is a cost of entry, the industry is still competitive as the “extra costs” of arising from entry are 
not transferred to customers. The reason is that  each firm is so small  that  they don’t  have market 
power and therefore they are forced to be price taker. The cost of entry is then just spread over to all 
participants in the industry or as Cabral (2007) sums up that “the basic idea is the same as in the 
model of perfect competition: A very small firm has a negligible impact on other firms and on price. 
It follows that it internalizes all of the costs and benefits from entering or exiting the industry: What 
is  good for  the  firm is  good for  society.”  What  is  true  for  entrant  is  also  true  for  the  incumbent.  
Incumbents don’t have market power and hence they are price takers. Hence, price is equal to 
expected marginal costs and as a result the market is efficient from a welfare point of view. As 
stated in section 3.2.1, the smallness of each firm is a crucial assumption in the model. 
 
To sum up, the main reason for competitive equilibrium is that the agents are price takers due to 
their small size. According to Cabral (2007) Hopenhayn shows “that the market equilibrium is 
efficient if firms are price takers —even if efficiency varies across firms and across periods”. Entry 
is important, because it preserve the smallness of firm and heterogeneity. Similarly, exit is needed 
so that low productive firms can cease their operations. The possibility to exit gives each firm the 
same alternative to test their efficiency. In other words, resource reallocation (i.e. exit and entry) is 
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one of the factors that keep the industry competitive in a world where there is imperfect 
information. The existence of a competitive and stationary equilibrium has also implications on the 
relationship between firm size and growth, which is the topic of the following section. 
 
3.3.2 The relationship between firm’s size and growth rate 
The evolution of the productivity shock will dictate the path of the industry, but it is the possibility 
to exit that creates a negative relationship between firm’s size and growth rate. The following 
example illustrates the reason. In the example, it is assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that there 
are only three different size classes – small, medium-sized and large firms. There is a one-to-one 
relationship between firm size and the productivity shock and hence one can use size and 
productivity interchangeably. Similarly for the sake of simplicity, one could assume that the 
productivity shock could only have three distinct paths45. In the future periods, productivity shock 
could increase, stay the same or decrease. These simplifications are then presented in picture 4.  
 
Firms will exit when the expected value turns negative for the first time. This basically means that 
low-productive firms (i.e. small firms) that expect that their productivity will stay the same or even 
decrease will exit. The exit is represented by the dotted lines in lowest row in picture 4. Therefore, 
the only small firms that remain in the industry are small firms that grow fast. This is not true for 
medium-sized or large firms, because selection doesn’t matter as much for these classes. If an 
equivalent negative productivity shock would both hit a small firm and a large firm, it is more likely 
that the large firm will continue to operate, because it doesn’t want to forfeit the option to operate in 
the industry. Therefore, medium-size firms’ productivity has the possibility to evolve in all 
directions. It is good to note that the largest firm’s productivity can’t grow beyond a certain limit, 
because the size of the productivity shock is restricted from above. Hence, the dotted line for the 
large firms.  
 
It is good to note that much can’t say on the evolution of the medium size firms, but actually this 
doesn’t matter. The selection of small firm’s is the only thing needed to reject Gibrat’s law. In other 
words, because the small firms are selected there is a negative relationship between firm size and 
growth rate.  The evolution of medium size firms can’t change this. If Gibrat’s law would be valid 
in its purest form it would mean that all the different size classes would grow at an equal rate. This 
is not the case in Hopenhayn’s model if entry cost is sufficiently low. However, the situation is 
                                               
45 The path of the productivity shock in Hopenhayn’s model was continuous. 
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different when the cost of entry is high enough to deter entry completely. Then growth will be 
purely random. The reason is that if no entry occurs, incumbents remain in the industry forever, as 
explained in section 3.2.3, and then evolution of industry is dictated only by the productivity shock 
which was by definition random.   
 
   
Picture 4 - The path of productivity shock evolution for different size classes 
 
The productivity shock follows a different process in Hopenhayn’s and in Gibrat’s model, but if one 
could assume for the sake of the argument that the processes were sufficiently close, the result 
would be interesting. As stated many times in chapter 2, there are subsamples that fail to reject 
Gibrat’s law. Could it be the case that these industries that don’t have rejected the law are similar to 
the industry that Hopenhayn’s model would define? If this is the case then it would mean that 
Gibrat’s law can never be valid, because growth wouldn’t be random, because growth is a result of 
firms maximizing profits and the visible “stochasticity” is only a result of this. Put differently, it is 
the classical argument that Gibrat’s law can be replicated with Hopenhayn’s model, but not the 
other way around.  
 
Gibrat’s law could be tested for an industry that satisfies the Hopenhayn’s industry assumptions and 
where there has been a large increase in cost of entry, preferably over a shorter period time.  The 
“new” null hypothesis should then be that the deviations from Gibrat’s law should be smaller after 
?
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(i.e.     <     ) 
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(i.e.     >     ) ??
Productivity grows
Productivity decreases
Productivity stays the same
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?
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the increase in cost of entry. The problem is then of course to find an industry that would fit these 
requirements. Another downside with this hypothesis is that sample selection bias would be still 
present.  
 
Age itself alone will not have an extra predicative role in Hopenhayn’s model meaning that two 
firms with identical size, but with different ages would have same path. Therefore, from a selection 
point of view it doesn’t matter if the firms are incumbents or new entrants. However, there is a 
difference between the different age cohorts. According to Farinas & Ruano (2005) any cohort of 
surviving firms at time ? stochastically dominates the cohort of entering firms at ? + 1. The reason 
is simple. The survived cohort contains older firms that have been more exposed to the selection 
process leading to a higher threshold for failure. To sum up, according to Cooley & Quadrini (2001) 
one of the model’s primary results is that, conditional on age, the dynamics of firms (growth, 
volatility of growth, job creation, job destruction and exit) are negatively related to the size firms. 
 
3.3.3 Profits and the option of staying in the industry 
The cost of entry has another important implication for the incumbent. It separates the entrant and 
the incumbent firm. The entrant has to pay the cost of entry when entering the industry in addition 
to the each period’s fixed cost. For the incumbent it is sufficient only to pay the fixed cost. In effect, 
the incumbent firms have an option that gives the possibility to stay in the industry without the need 
of pay a new entry cost. This option is naturally valuable and because of the option, it can be 
reasonable to endure periods with losses. In other words, the incumbent firm stays in the industry 
although it is making a loss, because it expects a turnaround in the future. The incumbent will not 
exit the industry for few periods, because if the business environment would turn once again 
positive it would have to pay the cost of entry. So, although the current cost of entry is sunk, the 
cost of entry from the possible re-entry is still relevant for the incumbent. This would explain why 
loss-making firms would stay in the industry. In addition, Hopenhayn shows that there is a positive 
lower bound for average industry profits. 
 
Balasubramanian & Sivadasan (2009) notes that “these firms [the firms in the industry] may not 
necessarily make a good return on their entry costs, which in this model they incur on entry, before 
they know their true productivity levels. However, having already incurred these sunk costs of 
entry, the inefficient firms will choose to remain in the market as they are able to cover their 
recurring costs at the prevailing price level”. It should be added that incumbents de facto earns more 
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than the opportunity cost, so in this sense firms that remain in industry are not doing anything 
wrong.  
 
The results are impressive and indeed Hopenhayn’s article is a seminal paper within the industry 
dynamics and evolution’s research. However, the model is built on certain key assumptions such as 
the productivity shock. Are the assumptions valid and realistic? Does it really explain why the 
industry evolves? Are there other variables that have been omitted from the analysis for the sake 
simplicity and tractability and are these omitted variables relevant and important? These questions 
are discussed in the next section where a critical view of the Hopenhayn model is presented. 
 
3.4 A critical view 
Although Hopenhayn’s results are impressive, there are some drawbacks. The competitive 
equilibrium is only a partial equilibrium as Sleet (2001) notes.  Basically, this means that 
Hopenhayn has assumed that the household (i.e. the demand side) acts optimally not matter what 
happens. Of course, the model is a simplification focusing on the dynamics of heterogeneous firm, 
but the partial equilibrium approach reduces the robustness of the solution if the intention is to show 
a truly competitive equilibrium. In other words, a truly competitive equilibrium would require that 
households behave optimally as a by-product of their own utility maximization. 
 
Also, what guarantees that an individual firm wouldn’t grow to have such a significant role that it 
would have market power? The equilibrium was competitive, because the individual firm was so 
small  that  it  was  essentially  a  price  taker.  The  new  flow  of  entrants  reduces  this  pressure  as  
explained in section 3.3.1, but the following example could be considered. Hopenhayn states that 
changes in size distribution are ambiguous after an increase in cost of entry, because there was both 
a  price  and  a  selection  effect.  The  exact  results  depend  on  the  exact  form  of  the  underlying  
distribution. Couldn’t it be case that for some distributions, the price effects dominates so much that 
there would be few firms that would dominate everybody else? In other words, what would happen 
if few firms would be able to exercise market power? This is unclear and can’t be answer without 
additional assumptions made on the underlying distributions. The question is not trivial as it could 
be the case the welfare implications could change if an incumbent or entrant would grow so much 
that it effectively would have market power.  
 
46 
 
In the models, the firms that are not productive will exit the industry. This is realistic, but exit is not 
always synonymous to failure as Plehn-Dujowich (2009) notes that “existing theories of industry 
dynamics focus exclusively on new entrants and assume that firm exit is synonymous with failure”. 
This is also true for Hopenhayn (1992), but the matter is not as straightforward as one would 
expect. There are two aspects that should be considered. 
 
The  first  is  that  although  a  firm  ceases  their  operations  in  one  industry,  it  doesn’t  mean  that  the  
resources are salvaged.  According to Dunne et al. (2005) on average 22 % of firms exit an industry 
or market in order to start producing a new product, but the importance of realigning the production 
varies from industry to industry. Dunne et al. (2005) continue that the respective percentage is 10 % 
for bakeries and ready-mix concrete, but for concrete block and brick sector the percentage is 33 %. 
Bernard et al. (2006) found that 66 % of surviving firms change their product mix every 5 years. 
Therefore, Plehn-Dujowich (2009) concludes that firms relocating across industries or product lines 
are empirically relevant in industry dynamics.  
 
It is good to note that the critique is not entirely correct. Firms will exit when the value of staying in 
the industry is less than the opportunity cost and Hopenhayn don’t specify that the resource couldn’t 
be used again. So there is the possibility that firms could reallocate their operations, but it is 
important to remember that the firms will consider this alternative only then when their productivity 
falls below the industry threshold. The reason is that the opportunity cost is normalized to zero for 
each firm. In other words, firms will exit only when they are unproductive in their current industry 
and not because they would be more productive in other industries. As seen above, firms quite often 
change their market and so this seems somewhat unrealistic.  
 
The second aspect is mergers and acquisitions. As stated in section 2.2.2, Dunne & Hughes (1994) 
argued that survival function is non-linear. Small firms have a high death rate, but the rate is not 
considerable smaller for medium sized firms. The reason is that these medium sized firms are taken-
over rather than simply ceasing their operations. In Dunne & Hughes (1994) report that 10 – 12 % 
of medium-sized and large firms are taken over. For small firms the figures are similar, but the 
takeovers represent a considerable larger share of industry exit for medium-sized and large firms. 
This aspect has not been taken into account in Hopenhayn’s model. A good question is that is there 
actually any benefit of merging two units as they would have limited market power. Nevertheless, 
the important question is that does the possibility of mergers and acquisition change the analysis on 
the growth-size relationship presented in section 3.3.2. This should be further studied.  
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Another point is that there is no aggregate uncertainty, meaning that the only source of the 
uncertainty is the firm-specific shocks. Certainly, aggregate shocks can play a role in real life as 
seen by the latest financial crises in 2008. Although the points above are all valid, there is one 
problem that should be focused on. This is the role and assumptions around the productivity shock. 
For example it is assumed that the firms did know the productivity shock’s distribution. This is 
certainly unrealistic. In addition, the model’s many results follow directly from the shock’s 
evolution. One could say that instead of showing impressive results, Hopenhayn just assumed them. 
    
3.4.1 The problem of exogenous shocks and the omitted variables 
Hopenhayn’s primary result is that the productivity shock defines and drives the evolution of the 
market. One has to ask that does this really explain anything. Hopenhayn’s contribution to the 
evolution of industry dynamics can be compared with progress between the basic Solow model and 
the general Solow model. Adding an exogenous growth component to the basic Solow model 
enabled continuous growth. Although the extension is not by any means trivial, it didn’t explain 
why the growth occurred in more detail. Similarly, the exogenous productivity supplements earlier 
models, but it doesn’t explain why firms are different in their internal efficiencies. In other words, 
the shock is in a sense a good explanation, but it isn’t sufficient. The inevitable question is that what 
drives then the productivity?  
 
This leads to the next and final step, which are the omitted factors. As any model, Hopenhayn’s 
model is a simplification in order to highlight one certain aspect or relationship. In this case the 
highlighted relationship is the one between productivity, profitability and selection. As Foster et al. 
(2008) points out that “productivity is only one of several possible idiosyncratic factors that 
determine profits. However, other idiosyncratic factors may affect survival as well”. Productivity is 
certainly an important relationship, but one can’t deny for example the role of finance as a 
constraint. Of course one could argue that Hopenhayn’s productivity shock entails all the different 
aspect of firm’s productivity ranging from efficient manufacturing to superior marketing, also 
finance.   
 
Also, the model was very supply driven, so one extension could be to treat demand as stochastic 
and see whether the results are still valid and robust. Foster et al. (2008) continue along this strand 
and  show  how  selection  can  created  with  also  demand  factors.  Finally,  a  natural  extension  to  
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Hopenhayn’s model is to treat the productivity shock as an endogenous variable. In other words, 
R&D should be introduced as a possible action for the firms. Different extensions are the theme of 
the following chapter. The aim is to explain in more detail what could explain the productivity 
shocks evolution and supplement the picture on the firm’s behavior. 
 
For example by adding a finance constraint, Cooley & Quadrini (2001) shows how age dependency 
can be introduced to the model. For example the size of the firms is more persistent for older firms. 
As Hopenhayn acknowledges age for the individual firm does not have an extra predicative role in 
the model. Is this a drawback? It was already shown by Dunne et al. (1989a) and Evans (1987) that 
age has a role. However, one could argue that size and the age of the firm move together. If size 
could be used as a good proxy for age, then it would unnecessary to analyze the age’s roles. 
Nevertheless, introducing the age component could be a good extension for the Hopenhayn model 
and actually Hopenhayn himself suggests this.  
4 Alternative explanations for variability of firm size 
The previous chapter explained in detail Hopenhayn’s seminal model on industry dynamics and 
firm-level heterogeneity. The main result was the existence of a stationary equilibrium with positive 
entry and exit. In addition, as a by-product it showed how small firms grow faster than larger firms 
due to the selection-effect. However, the model had some limitations. One of the elemental 
problems in the model was that it didn’t really explain that much, as all the results were built upon 
the  assumption  of  the  productivity  shock.  In  others  words,  the  model  didn’t  explain  how  the  
productivity shock was formed and it omitted several interesting variables such as finance 
constraint or the demand stochasticity. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to extend the model to cover more variables with different 
assumptions. The extension will not be analyzed with same vigor as Hopehayn’s model, but rather 
the focus is to present how the models’ assumptions and results are different. The chapter consists 
of three sub-sections. The first contemplates the role of Bayesian learning. After this, the role of 
finance is studied in two different sections.  
 
4.1 Passive learning (and fittest survives)  
In Hopenhayn, the firm knew the distribution of the productivity shocks and merely reacted to each 
period’s updates on the shock. The firm didn’t engage in any learning activities as explained in 
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section 3.4. The purpose of this and the following section is to discuss what impact does learning 
have on the results. This section focuses on the concept of passive learning. This is done by 
introducing the classical article by Jovanovic (1982) “Selection and the evolution of Industry”. The 
models have very similar premises and in fact they base the analysis and the model on common 
observations, although Jovanovic focuses more on the individual firm’s behavior in addition to 
dynamics of the industry itself.   
 
The general structure is very similar to Hopenhayn and other industry evolution models46. Jovanovic 
presents a model where there is infinite amount of firms that are price takers just as in Hopenhayn. 
The incumbents manufacture homogenous products in a small industry and the firms’ objective is to 
maximize expected profits. The input prices were deterministic and dynamic in Hopenhayn, but in 
Jovanovic’s model input prices are assumed to be constant. Each period the incumbents have to 
decide whether to continue and if they do so, then how much to produce. The decision on 
production happens before the random variable is revealed. However, the significant difference 
between Jovanovic’s and Hopenhayn’s models is in the assumptions around uncertainty.  
 
Both models presented so far have had firm-level heterogeneity. In Jovanovic, firm’s costs create 
the heterogeneity as they have different cost efficiency levels that are drawn from an initial 
distribution. This stochasticity in costs will lead to that the firms are different. It is a good question 
that is productivity that much of a different concept from cost efficiency. Therefore in this section 
core efficiency will be used as a term to define both productivity and cost efficiency. The separating 
factor  between  the  two  models  is  the  assumptions  on  the  distribution  of  core  efficiency.  In  
Jovanovic, the true costs are constant, but unknown. The firm only knows the distribution and the 
variance of costs. In Hopenhayn, the distribution of productivity was not specified in more detail, 
but one can assume that the agents know the distribution, mean and variance of the productivity. 
Ericson & Pakes (1995) validates this assumption by stating that competitive firms “doesn’t engage 
in Bayesian learning as they know the distribution of those shocks”. 
 
Equation 17 illustrates the composition of costs in Jovanovic. The variable ?? is a random variable 
independent  across  firms  and  it  consists  of  two  components.  The  first  is  the  true  costs,  ?, that is 
constant and it defines the core efficiency of the firm as larger values of ? will generate larger costs 
                                               
46 Actually, Jovanovic’s model precedes Hopenhayn’s model and according to Hopenhayn (1992) Jovanovic’s model 
was one of the first models of industry dynamics with firm-level heterogeneity. 
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at all levels of output. As stated above, true costs are unknown to the firms. The second factor is the 
firm-specific shock or noise variable that is i.i.d. The firm knows the mean and variance of ??. It is 
good to note that as the uncertainty is only on firm-level it means that the aggregate variables are 
deterministic just as in Hopenhayn. In other words, the incumbents treat the price path with perfect 
foresight. This does not mean the prices are constant over time. 
17)  ?? = ?????               ?? = ? + ??               ??~??0,???  ?. ?.?.   
It is the incumbent firms’ mission to find out the true nature of the core efficiency. This is done by 
observing the fluctuating costs and using the knowledge of the distribution and variance to narrow 
down the true costs. As the firm receive more information the precision of the estimate increases. 
As mentioned earlier, this process is called Bayesian learning. Another term used to describe the 
activity is passive learning as the firm learns as a by-product of its operations. Intuitively this means 
that the firms enters or continues in an industry, because it wants to obtain evidence if it is 
profitable or not.  
 
In case the incumbent judges that it is inefficient (i.e. it has a high true costs), it will exit. The exit 
decision will be made by comparing the opportunity cost with the value of continuing in the 
industry. Once the opportunity cost is higher than the firm’s value the firm will exit. The value of 
the firm is calculated as dynamic programming problem similar to Hopenhayn. The dynamic 
programming is a suitable calculation method as there is an infinite-time horizon and the structure 
of the problem is recursive.  
 
4.1.1 The elemental role of information 
The exit process and role of information in Jovanovic is different from Hopenhayn. Of course, the 
firms react to new information in both models, but in Jovanovic the information is utilized to 
determine the full nature of the firm. One prerequisite for this is that, the core efficiency of the firm 
is constant, because if core efficiency would fluctuate the firm couldn’t narrow it down. To the 
contrary, in Hopenhayn this core efficiency is continuously changing. This has an impact on the 
reason why firms exit. In Hopenhayn, the incumbent firm will exit only then when it believes that 
core efficiency has reached an unprofitable level for a sufficient long enough time while in 
Jovanovic the exit will happen when the firm is sure that it is an inefficient operator. The difference 
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is subtle, but important, because it crystallizes why the models are different. In practice, this means 
that in Hopenhayn an incumbent can have the worst core efficiency in the industry, but still remain 
in the market if it believes that the productivity will (soon) surge. To the contrary, in Jovanovic if 
the incumbent would realize that it is the worst player it will definitely exit. 
 
Entry is also a possibility in Jovanovic. This happens by paying a cost of entry. The cost is sunken 
and nonrecoverable and according to Jovanovic it can be thought for example as a cost of 
establishing a particular location. Once the possible entrant has decided to enter, it will be treated as 
an incumbent. This is standard. Before entering, the possible entrant does not know the actual true 
cost parallel to the incumbent. The entrant knows the distribution, the mean and the variance of the 
potential true costs. This is very similar to Hopenhayn, but role of entry is not as significant. 
 
In Hopenhayn, the role of entry and the exit was that it ensured resource reallocation. New entrants 
replaced incumbents that’s productivity shock was falling and hence were effectively unprofitable. 
In Jovanovic, the firm will exit if the observations reveal that the firm is inefficient as stated above. 
One by one, the inefficient drops down from the industry. This leads to that eventually only the 
most efficient survive the competitive pressure. In other words, after industry has reached the 
stationary equilibrium only the truly efficient remains in the industry. There is no need to enter, 
because all agents know that the incumbents have a superior cost advantage and therefore the 
information gathering process is redundant and entry ceases. It is interesting how the role of 
information has an impact also on the entry process. 
 
Only if the production ? is concave in ??, then there will be entry and exit in a stationary 
equilibrium. The reason is that if the production function ? is concave in ??, then each period the 
remaining firms will produce less and less. The new entrants replace this decrease. Naturally, before 
the stationary equilibrium entry can occur under both assumptions. New firms would enter to gather 
information and try their luck. To sum up on entry, in Hopenhayn entry occurred in stationary 
equilibrium, because they replaced exiting firms. In Jovanovic, there is not a similar need because 
the only reason to enter is to acquire information and once the market has saturated there is no room 
for entry.     
 
Jovanovic’s model can also show that younger, and hence smaller firms, will have a faster growth 
rate than larger firms.  Jovanovic first argues that the growth rate can’t be the same for all firms, 
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because it would require that the entire distribution of ??? be  the  same  for  all47.  If  Gibrat’s  Law  
would  hold,  it  would  require  that  two  firms  with  the  same  estimate  of  the  true  efficiency,  but  
different precisions, would have the same distribution. This cannot obviously hold. In other words, 
the first version of Gibrat’s law will not hold in the model. Jovanovic’s second argument states that 
the growth rate can’t be same within a single age cohort. The reason is that the smaller firms will 
have a higher variance in their growth rates as they are more sensitive to information. Brock & 
Evans (1986) states that this is, because of young firms have less precise estimates of their true 
abilities. Young firms will also grow faster and this is the consequence of simple statistical 
principle, the Jensen’s inequality.  
 
 
Picture 5- Jensen's inequality in Jovanovic's model 
 
According to Jovanovic (1982), change in the costs ?? (i.e. the increase or decrease of the true 
efficiency) is increasing in ?? as can be seen above in picture 5. Basically, this can be translated into 
that the higher costs are the higher will be the benefit from a decrease in costs. The expected change 
in costs will always be higher than the actual growth rate as implied by the Jensen’s inequality48.  
                                               
47 ??? = ???
????
?  , the expected rate of decrease in costs (i.e. the expected increase in efficiency) 
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The link between costs, ??, and size is similar to the one the relationship between productivity and 
size in Hopenhayn’s (1992) model. Those firms that have a high costs will also be small. Therefore, 
small firms will grow faster than the large firms and Gibrat’s law can’t hold in environment that is 
specified by Jovanovic model. 
 
However, there is a more interesting finding regarding the growth-question. Namely, according to 
Jovanovic the true efficiency converges to a constant. Therefore, for the mature (and hence larger 
firms) the growth rates should be equal. The reason is lies in selection and the fact that the precision 
increase as time lapses. In other words, as the industry matures the firms’ growth rate converges and 
decreases as there is less need to revise one’s production. This is because the surviving firms have 
already gathered enough information and they have deducted that they are efficient. It is good to 
note that in Jovanovic’s model there is also negative relationship between age and growth. This 
could imply that Gibrat’s law could be valid for matured industries or at least the deviations from 
the law should be smaller for larger and more matured firms as found by Evans (1987 a, b). With 
regards the new and more refined null hypothesis, a possible new test could be to choose two 
similar industries, but with different maturities or phases in the product life cycle. It should be 
expected that the more matured industry follows more closely Gibrat’s law. 
 
Jovanovic’s model fortifies the view that Gibrat’s law can’t be valid and there are no clear cut 
special cases where the growth would be stochastic as in Hopenhayn’s model. Further, it validates 
that the age is an important factor when discussing growth. The age-dependency emerges, because 
firms don’t know their distribution and this is a realistic assumption. Nevertheless, there are aspects 
that the model doesn’t take into account. One is active learning, but the theme of the following 
section is to combine the age and size dependency. This is done by introducing capital and finance 
as possible factors. 
 
4.2 Introducing finance constraints 
The previous section discussed the role of (passive) learning for industry evolution. The purpose of 
this section is to discuss impact of finance. The interest is in environments where there is a friction 
in finance for example due to high debt or equity costs. Cooley & Quadrini (2001) presents a 
simplified model of Hopenhayn where finance is an issue. What makes the approach of Cooley & 
Quadrini  more  robust  is  that  their  most  important  contribution  is  to  show  the  relationship  of  
simultaneous dependence of industry dynamics on size and age by assuming persistent shocks and 
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frictions in finance. This simultaneous dependence means that similar size companies will grow at 
different rates if they have different ages. In addition, they present more detailed predictions on 
behavior of the firm for example on the size of dividend it pays and debt it takes. 
 
4.2.1 Frictions in finance and persistent shocks 
Cooley & Quadrini build their firm dynamics on a simplified version of Hopenhayn. Basically, it 
means that there is a continuum of firms that produce a homogenous product. Instead of 
maximizing expected profits the firm’s objective is to maximize expected dividends over an 
infinite-time horizon49. There is no outside pressure from other industries. So the “competition” 
occurs only within the industry. The incumbent firm can use both capital and labor as inputs for 
production and they are perfect complements. According to Cooley & Quadrini this means that the 
capital-labor ratio is constant. Depreciation needs to be taken into account when capital is a possible 
input variable. Machines and equipment wear out as they are used. In Cooley & Quadrini’s model it 
is assumed that capital depreciates with a constant rate. The production technology has decreasing 
returns to scale due to concavity of the production function. The intuition given in the article is that 
limited managerial or organizational resources lead to that output will increase less than the 
increased inputs.   
 
The  model  is  built  on  the  assumption  of  firm-level  heterogeneity.  There  are  two  sources  of  
heterogeneity. In addition to the standard productivity shock, frictions in finance will make firms 
(even more) different. As in Hopenhayn, a productivity shock stipulates how efficiently the inputs 
are used in production. The productivity shock itself is defined more elaborately than in Hopenhayn 
as it is composed of two different parts. The first part is the persistent shock, similar to the serially 
correlated productivity shock and it can be interpreted as technological differences. The persistent 
shock follows a first-order Markov process, meaning history doesn’t have a role as discussed 
earlier. The second component represents the pure accidentally or lucky events and they are 
modeled  as  nonpersistent  and  i.i.d  shocks  with  zero  mean.  The  distinction  between  two  types  of  
shocks was not present in Hopenhayn and therefore Hopenhayn’s model can be seen as a special 
case of Cooley & Quadrini’s model in this case. The reason is simple. In Hopenhayn’s model the 
pure accidental random variable exists, but it has zero mean and variance and hence no impact. 
 
                                               
49 If all dividends were to be paid to shareholders, then it wouldn’t make a difference if the firm value or dividends were 
maximized. However, in Cooley & Quadrini some of the earnings are retained in the firm and this could have 
implications on the results. 
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There are also differences in timing of the different shocks. The persistent shock is revealed one 
time period before the production while the “luck” shock is revealed in the same period as 
production occurs. The amount of capital and labor is decided in the same period as the persistent 
shock is revealed. Cooley & Quadrini states “in the absence of financial frictions, the efficiency 
level of the firm fully determines its size”. Put differently, the results would be very similar to 
Hopenhayn. 
 
The question of finance was irrelevant in the previous models. It was assumed implicitly that firms 
had ample resources and access to the capital markets without any extra costs. This is not the case 
in Cooley & Quadrini as finance is the extra layer that makes the approach and results different. 
Generally, new investments’ financing can be categorized into internal and external financing. 
Internal finance consists of retained earnings and external finance is understood as new equity and 
debt. All three forms of finance are possible in Cooley & Quadrini. There is a wide range of articles 
and studies on the relative advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of finance. This 
thesis will not go deeper into the finer details, but a general stylized fact is that external finance is 
more expensive than internal.  
 
This stylized fact is reflected in Cooley & Quadrini’s model as they state “the financial frictions 
arise because of the following assumptions: (a) there is a cost or premium associated with 
increasing equity by issuing new shares, compared to reinvesting profits; (b) defaulting on the debt 
is costly”.  Equity finance can be expensive because it dilutes the value of existing stocks. Another 
reason could be the information effects related to the information asymmetries between managers 
and investors as Myers & Majluf (1984) showed. However, also the debt has to be expensive, in 
order to have frictions in the financial market. Cooley & Quadrini’s (2001) states if debt were 
costless, all firms would prefer it over expensive equity. It is good to note that to the contrary to 
other models so far, the firm has to decide whether it wants to pay dividends or not. After all, the 
firm’s objective is to maximize dividends. Therefore, there exists a threshold level on equity and 
when this threshold is surpassed the firm will start to pay dividends.  Dividends and the payout-ratio 
stipulate the level of available internal finance. 
 
In the model, the debt contract lasts for one period. The borrowed money should be paid back 
together with interest at the end of the period. The loan is acquired from a financial intermediary. 
The primary reason that debt is expensive is that it is not risk-free as there is a possibility of default 
and hence the firm wouldn’t be able to repay the borrowed funds. To compensate for the possible 
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bankruptcy, the financial intermediary will charge a higher interest rate which depends on the 
probability of default. The firm will decide on default after productivity shock and amount of 
revenues have been revealed. It will default if its net worth is equal to or less than zero. The 
financial intermediary verifies the bankruptcy. It is important to note that the cost of verification is 
transferred back to the firm by embedding the cost into the interest rate. Interestingly, default does 
not lead to liquidation and exit as it is not in the interest of the financial intermediary and therefore 
the debt is renegotiated on new terms.  
 
Although the default decision seems to be similar concept to the exit decision in Hopenhayn and the 
other models,  it  is  not so.  To the contrary,  the firms continue after the debt has been renegotiated 
and hence no exit occurs due to defaults. Exit will take place exogenously and the firm will exit 
when it turns unproductive. Hence, it is only the productivity shocks that drive the exit behavior. 
Why would any firm want use equity if default doesn’t lead to exit? The reason is that debt is 
expensive and after a certain threshold it reduces the firm’s value as will be seen below. After the 
default and renegotiations, the firm returns back to business. To sum up, verification and the 
possibility of bankruptcy make the debt financing expensive. 
 
But what would be the reasons to use external finance? The most imminent reason is that it gives 
the possibility to expand the firm’s asset and hence production without the immediate need to 
generate extra revenue. If external financing is introduced, the firm can expand its production 
beyond a level that only internal finance would permit. Naturally, this will lead to increased 
expected profits. The downside of debt is that it is expensive and that debt amplify the volatility of 
firm’s value, which has an adverse effect on firm value due concavity. New equity doesn’t have this 
amplification effect and to the contrary it reduces the stress from default risk. Cooley & Quadrini 
notes that the problem on equity expansion is that due to decreasing returns to scale the increase in 
production is not proportional to the increase in equity. The right combination of debt and equity is 
a trade-off between the advantages and disadvantage of the different forms of finance. It goes 
without saying that finance will have a considerable effect on dynamics of the firm and industry. 
 
As in all the industry models covered so far, entry is a possibility. Entry happens by paying a fixed 
cost, which can be assumed to be sunk, nonrecoverable, and the additional cost of issuing new 
equity. Naturally, the firm enters only if the expected value of the firm is larger than or equal to cost 
of entry. According to Cooley & Quadrini all new firms will be of the highest efficiency, because 
high productivity entrants have a higher firm value than entrants with small productivity. The 
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assumption is justified by the observations that in general new firms are more efficient than 
incumbents due to better technology. In each period, entry will occur as long as the surplus from 
entry is nonnegative. The arbitrage conditions will ensure that entry is optimal50. The role of entry 
and exit can be seen as part of the resource reallocation process just as in the other models.  
 
4.2.2 Simultaneous dependencies between growth and age 
It goes without saying that the model can produce more diverse predictions than Hopenhayn’s 
model as finance is an additional component and source of heterogeneity. Cooley & Quadrini can 
for example show that small firms take on more debt or that small firms face higher rates of profits 
only conditioning on the frictions in finance and surviving. The first result is obtained, because the 
firm becomes more alarmed of the profits’ volatility as their size increases and therefore borrows 
less in proportion to its size51. Hence, the share of debt is decreasing in size of the equity. Cooley & 
Quadrini notes that “as a consequence of higher borrowing, small firms face higher probability of 
default”. The second outcome is as a by-product of the capital structure decision. As the larger firms 
use more equity, they will be less profitable also due to diminish returns on scale.  
 
The outcomes above are interesting as they supplement the picture on the behavior of the firm, but 
Cooley & Quadrini can also comment on the growth-size relationship. They firsts study the 
scenario, where there are frictions in finance, but no variations in the productivity shock. They are 
able to show that growth-size relationship is negative. This is done by assuming that the 
productivity shock is binary in the sense that in only takes values zero or one. The firms with a zero 
productivity shock will exit and hence the remaining firms have identical internal efficiencies. The 
negative relationship can be traced back to financial results presented above. Smaller firms will 
have higher rate of earnings and the dividend payout ratio will be lower for smaller firms. In other 
words, small firms plowback more money into the firm and have relatively more internal financing. 
These retained earnings are then used to finance investments and which will lead effectively to 
faster growth. The standard deviation for growth is also higher for smaller firms expect for very 
small firms. 
 
                                               
50 Arbitrage conditions means changes in output and input prices which lead to changes in firm value 
51 Cooley & Quadrini argue “that the firm compares the marginal increase in the expected profits with the marginal 
increase in its volatility”. The reason that volatility is used is that the increasing volatility decrease firm’s value due to 
objective function’s concavity. Basically, volatility is one of finance’s costs. 
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According to Cooley & Quadrini “the model generates an unconditional age dependence of firm 
dynamics”, but this dependence is ostensible. Cooley & Quadrini continues that “young firms are 
small,  which in turn derives from the small  size of new entrants.” In other words,  the reason why 
there  seems  to  be  relationship  between  age  and  growth  is  that  age  is  only  a  proxy  for  size.  The  
relationship can be shown to be robust in case also the productivity shock can vary. In order to 
create a simultaneous dependence both on age and size two sources of firm-level heterogeneity is 
needed. In this variant, an interesting finding is that higher productivity firms have higher default 
rates because they predispose themselves to more risk. 
 
Cooley & Quadrini show that how the growth rate, default rate and job creations have a negative 
relationship with both age and size with the exception of job creation for very small firms. The 
results are received after the age and size, respectively, have been controlled. The reason for size 
dependencies is similar to the case presented above, small firms plowback more revenues than large 
firms and this results in growth. The age dependence outcome results from the assumption that 
young firms are highly productive. This leads to that young firms have higher rates of profits and as 
explained above, it will eventually transform into faster growth. It is good to note that if the shocks 
were not persistent there would be no age dependency, because the difference between the firms 
would fade away quickly. Similarly, if the new entrants would have low productivity, the age-
dependency wouldn’t exist.  
 
To sum up, Cooley & Quadrini’s main result is that firm’s size will not anymore depends on its 
internal efficiency. The size-dependency existed, because small firms plowed back more money in 
in order to avoid using costly external finance. In Cooley & Quadrini’s model, the size and growth 
relationship will always be negative, simply because the entrants had a high productivity. In other 
words, Gibrat’s law will not be valid when studied with Cooley & Quadrini’s model. However, the 
age-dependency can vary and a testable hypothesis could be to look at industries were the 
productivity doesn’t fluctuate anymore. This implies that for more mature industries the age-
dependencies should be more stochastic than for young industries.  
 
The results are interesting when compared to the ones obtained in Hopenhayn. After all, Hopenhayn 
didn’t have any age dependence even though there were persistent shocks. The difference seems to 
be in the role of new entrants. In Hopenhayn, the entrants didn’t know what type of firms they are, 
but in Cooley & Quadrini the role is known and hence only high productive firms enter. In the 
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following section, another variant of Hopenhayn’s model is presented with liquidity constraints. 
Although the assumptions are similar, the results are somewhat different from Hopenhayn. 
 
4.3 Survival of the fattest 
Also Murto & Terviö (2010) has studied the impact of finance on the firms’ evolution and behavior. 
The main difference with Cooley & Quadrini’s (2001) model is that the inability to finance its 
operations leads to exit when in Cooley & Quadrini’s model this only leads to renegotiation of debt. 
As in other models, the profit-maximizing firm is the primary agent and the objective of the firm is 
to maximize the expected present value of the income to the shareholders52. The fear of premature 
exit, and hence the loss of business, encourage firms to hoard cash as a safety measure. This is 
costly, because cash pays less interest than dividends. Murto & Terviö explains the liquidity 
constraint as the inability to raise new funds53. 
 
The  other  and  more  important  result  is  that  the  model  leads  to  the  “survival  of  the  fattest”.  The  
result is rather different when compared to the other models. For example Jovanovic’s (1982) 
model leads to the “survival of the fittest” and in Hopenhayn (1992) it was always the most 
productive that survived in the industry. So, in a sense introducing a liquidity constraint, changes 
the results drastically. However, the results of the different models are of course not directly 
comparable. The focus in Murto & Terviö’s model is not the same as in the ones presented earlier. 
The key conceptual difference is illustrated by picture 6 which is an adaption from Jovanovic’s 
(1982) article. Basically, Murto & Terviö are interested in what happens once the firm’s 
productivity has decreased sufficiently low that exit is a valid alternative. They argue that 
sometimes it is rational policy to exit the industry precautionary. 
 
                                               
52 The model is solved numerically with dynamic programming as there is no close-ended solution. 
53 The source of the inability to raise new funds is not modeled. Murto & Terviö discuss that their model is a special 
case of a more general model where raising news funds is expensive. In their case, the cost of raising new cash is so 
high that it is never optimal to do so. Murto & Terviö presents also the model where it is possible to raise new cash as a 
lump sum. Finally, there are no other sources of imperfections. 
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Picture 6 – Illustration of the conceptual differences between Murto & Terviö (2010) and Jovanovic’s (1982) model. 
 
4.3.1 The importance of cash 
According Murto & Terviö (2010), their model is similar to the ones in Hopenhayn (1992) and 
Dixit & Pindyck (1994, Ch 8.4), but naturally there are differences. The firms’ revenue consists of 
two components as the revenue is the product of price and the firm specific productivity. However, 
the productivity shock follows a different path. The productivity shock follows a Brownian motion 
in Murto & Terviö (2010). In other words, the productivity shock evolves continuously while in 
Hopenhayn (1992) and the other models the productivity moved in discrete jumps54. The random 
walk is presented in equation 18 where ?? is the increment of a standardized wiener process and µ 
is the expected mean of productivity.55 
 
18)  ?? ?  ???? ? ????  
 
Naturally, the price is determined by the demand curve that is everywhere strictly downward 
sloping. The industry is competitive so each individual firm doesn’t have market power. Hence, the 
marginal revenue is constant, ?. In order operate the firm has to pay a fixed cost. Hence, the profit 
is difference between revenue and the fixed cost. Additionally, the firm earns interest on the cash it 
                                               
54 There are also similarities. For example the Brownian motion is also a Markov process as was the productivity shock 
in Hopenhayn (1992).  
55 The shocks, dw, are independent across firms. 
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accumulated. The profit can be paid out as dividends or retained as cash in the firm. As stated 
earlier, cash has an important role in Murto & Terviö’s model and to further understand its role one 
should look at the exit process56.  
 
Exit is irreversible and without an additional exit cost. As in Hopenhayn’s (1992) model, the firm 
will exit if the productivity decreases under the critical threshold level. Similarly, this doesn’t mean 
that making a loss is a sufficient reason to exit as discussed in section 3.3.3. In other words, there 
can be periods of losses and in Murto & Terviö’s model. These losses have to be covered with cash. 
This is the major difference with other models as they implicitly assumed that firms can always 
cover their losses. In Murto & Terviö’s model, firms have an initial stock of cash and this can only 
change by retaining some of the earnings. As stated, retaining some of the earnings is costly as cash 
pays less interest than dividends. Nevertheless, hoarding cash can be optimal as in case that the firm 
doesn’t have enough cash to cover its negative cash flow it is forced to exit immediately 
irrespective of what the productivity is. If firm decide to exit as a precautionary measure, the 
remaining cash will be paid back to the shareholders. Obviously nothing will be paid to the 
shareholders if the firm is forced to exit.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
56 Murto & Terviö presents two different cases, one where the firm is unconstrained and one where the firm is 
constrained. The assumption and model presented are for the constrained case. 
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Picture 7 - Optimal policy regions of a liquidity constraint firm from Murto & Terviö (2010) 
 
Picture 7 illustrates the impact of the liquidity constraint on the firm’s behavior. The picture is taken 
from Murto & Terviö’s article where ? is the productivity of the firm, ? is the amount of cash the 
firm has and ? is the fixed costs.  The firm has three different alternatives and they are exiting the 
industry, continuing in the industry and paying dividend and finally continuing in the industry and 
not paying dividends. The firm will always pay dividends when it is in the dividend region, but it 
will never stay there as the firm is always moved to the continuation region after the cash been 
distributed to shareholders57. When the productivity is sufficiently high or the firm has ample 
finance,  the  probability  of  exit  is  so  small  that  the  firm can  transfer  the  cash  to  the  shareholders.  
According to Murto & Terviö (2010), the liquidity constraint has no direct impact on the dividend 
policy, only on the exit policy.  
 
The firm will always exit when revenue falls below ?* irrespective if there is liquidity constraint or 
not. The liquidity constrained firm is forced to exit when revenue, ?, is smaller than costs, ?, and it 
                                               
57 Naturally, no cash is paid in the continuation region. 
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has no cash. The most interesting area is the one where the firm has a very little cash (small s) and 
revenue (x) is just above the minimum required revenue (x*). According to Murto & Terviö, this 
kind of firm could in principle continue, but they further elaborate that “for sufficiently small s the 
firm is so unlikely to bounce back to a positive cash flow before s hits zero that it is better exiting 
immediately and just taking the remaining s.” In other words, the firm exits as precautionary action 
in order to ensure that the shareholders receive at least something. This precautionary exit is 
illustrated  by  the  small  area  between  continuation  region  and  the  dotted  xmin line.   The  result  of  
precautionary exit is that some marginally productive firms that would have survived a temporally 
loss will exit due to insufficient funds (or more accurately in order to preempt forced exit)58.  
 
In addition to the forced a precautionary exit, Murto & Terviö has assumed an exogenous death rate 
? “at which firms are forced to exit with their cash holdings as the exit value”. This will not 
drastically change the behavior of the firms as the difference according to Murto & Terviö is that 
firms take probability of exogenous death into account in their discounting. The assumption is made 
to guarantee a steady state.  Firms can enter the industry by paying the cost of entry, ?. The 
productivity of the entering firms is known and all the new firms have initial cash holdings ??. The 
entry is endogenous and it must fulfill the zero-profit condition59. Similar to Hopenhayn (1992) 
there is no aggregate uncertainty in the steady state. According to Murto & Terviö “all firms follow 
the same optimal policy, which in turn results in a stationary distribution of [productivity] z”.  
 
4.3.2 Another look on the growth and welfare question 
Regarding Gibrat’s law the results are similar to Hopenhayn (1992) if production (i.e. productivity) 
is a measure of size. There are few exceptions. Namely, the selection effect is much stricter as there 
are precautionary exits. On the other hand, if the firm has ample cash it can sustain longer periods 
of loss and therefore is not forced to exit as often as in Hopenhayn’s model. The total impact of 
these two contradictory forces is ambiguous without additional assumptions. Murto & Terviö 
analyzed the impact of the liquidity constraint with numerical analysis and found that “the liquidity 
constraint has a negative impact on mean productivity at low levels of [cost of entry] ?“. So, when 
the cost of entry is low, the “fat” firms survive and one should expect that there should be fewer 
deviations from Gibrat’s law. This could be a new testable hypothesis if an industry that fits the 
                                               
58 One implication of this is that all exits are basically precautionary.  
59 Formally this that the following equation must be true 
 
????? , ??? = ? + ?? 
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given assumptions can be identified. Murto & Terviö has estimated that when the cost of entry is 
sufficiently low the mean productivity decreases up to 15 %. The impact of the model’s second 
parameter initial cash, ??, has also an impact. Murto & Terviö states that “the liquidity constraint is 
harsher when ?? is small, so the relative distortion is always decreasing in ?? as the constraint 
becomes milder”. 
 
Liquidity constraint has also an impact on welfare and Murto & Terviö has identified three different 
sources of distortion. They are higher aggregate entry cost (due to higher turnover), lower average 
productivity, and higher liquidity costs. They further state that “the only component of welfare that 
can be affected by the liquidity constraint is consumer surplus, which varies in the opposite 
direction  as  [price]  p”.   The  distortion  of  from the  lower  average  productivity  is  due  to  the  same 
contradictory forces as stated above. To sum up, liquidity constraints can have a clear impact both 
on welfare and the growth-size relationship. The exact magnitude depends on the further 
assumptions, but these findings further strengthen the view that Gibrat’s law can’t be valid. 
5 Conclusions and discussion  
This thesis has studied Gibrat’s law and the firm dynamics with the help of conventional industry 
dynamics model. Gibrat’s law is an old theory and it has been studied extensively for past 60 years. 
Although the initial studies accepted the law, further studies have shown that the law should be 
rejected. The development of empirical methods is one of the reasons why the stance on Gibrat has 
changed. However, the results have not always been clear-cut and as explained in section 2.3, there 
have been many studies that have accepted the law in whole or for some subsample. Therefore, this 
thesis states that the question is not whether Gibrat’s law is valid or not, but rather when and with 
what restrictions is it valid. Another important matter to explore is that why Gibrat’s law should be 
valid. 
 
This thesis argued that the Gibrat’s law can’t be a law in a strict sense although it can be possible to 
observe Gibrat-like firm growth. The earlier studies have presented plenty of reasons why the law 
should be rejected. A popular explanation was that small firms are better at innovating. Yet, at the 
same time it  have  been  acknowledged  that  it  is  more  likely  that  large  firm invests  more  in  R&D,  
because of the larger risks for small firms. Another explanation was that small firms are more agile 
than large firms because of risk of losing reputation or diseconomies of scale. These are fine 
reasons, but there are more fundamental and comprehensive explanations to indicate that Gibrat’s 
law can’t be valid. 
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Namely, it can be shown that in Hopenhayn’s (1992) industry dynamics model firm’s growth rate 
can be both stochastic and proportional to firm size. Hopenhayn’s model is a traditional industry 
dynamics model where there is a continuum of firms that maximize the expected firm value. Both 
entry and exit is endogenous. In addition, the firm’s productivity shock is stochastic making the 
firms heterogenetic. Therefore, it is truly amazing that Hopenhayn can show that the stationary 
equilibrium is competitive and hence there is no welfare loss. If the cost of entry is not too high and 
some auxiliary assumptions are satisfied, then small firms will grow faster than larger firms. The 
reason is selection as small firms that don’t have a bright future prospect don’t have the incentive to 
continue in the industry and thus only the most efficient small firms are “selected” to continue. 
However, if the cost of entry is too high, then there is no selection and the industry will continue as 
such forever implying that the observed growth is stochastic. 
 
However, this doesn’t mean that the actual growth is stochastic, because growth is a result of firms 
maximizing profits. In other words, both incumbents and entrants make different decisions based on 
the available information and these decisions leads eventually to growth that sometimes can be 
observe  as  random  patterns.  For  example  if  the  entry  cost  is  too  high,  then  the  possible  entrants  
decide not to join the industry. This decision helps creating the environment, where one could 
observe  stochastic  growth.  Therefore,  growth  is  never  purely  stochastic  as  there  is  an  underlying  
process that is deterministic. These findings could explain why sometimes studies reject the law and 
sometimes they accept it. Of course Hopenhayn’s model is a stand-alone model, but it opens the 
possibility  for  other  models  were  Gibrat’s  law  could  be  a  special  case.  Three  other  models  were  
presented that were similar to Hopehayn’s model and they all more or less confirmed that Gibrat’s 
law can’t valid.  
 
This thesis also touched upon on what induces growth. In Gibrat’s model growth was random, at 
least compared to the firm size, but the conventional economics models offered more intriguing 
explanations for growth. Hopenhayn (1992) explained that growth arises from superior productivity 
meaning that those firms that are more productive will also grow faster. A similar explanation 
where given by Jovanovic (1982). The difference between these two models is that in Hopenhayn’s 
model the firms reacted to an exogenous productivity shock and in Jovanovic the firms attempted to 
deduct their own true productivity. Jovanovic defined productivity as cost efficiency while 
Hopenhayn didn’t make this distinction. 
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One of the past research’s problems is that the law has been studied in a generic way meaning that 
the focus has solely been on testing if the law is valid or not. One of the aims of this study was to 
identify to testable hypothesis that would more accurate and hence they would further clarify the 
role of Gibrat’s law. Fortunately, it was possible to find new testable hypothesis. For example 
Gibrat’s law could be tested for an industry where there has been a large increase in cost of entry, 
preferably over a shorter period time60. The expected result is that after the increase in cost of entry, 
there should be less deviation from Gibrat’s law. One possible idea for further studies is to test these 
new hypotheses. 
 
The models used in this study are not designed specifically to study Gibrat’s law and many times 
the models’ focus was on industry-level rather than firm-level. The results from these industry 
models can be seen as more robust as the growth-size relationship results are by-products of other 
studies. Nevertheless, one possibility for future study is to design models that are more focused on 
the growth-size relationship in order to create new testable hypothesis. There are a plethora of 
models available, so these could be reused somehow. 
 
Another possible area that should be further studied is the role of the demand side. All the models 
presented in the thesis are supply-driven and they assume that the demand side behaves optimally. 
In other words, these are partial equilibrium models and of course they are not as robust as general 
equilibrium models. Bergin & Bernhardt (2008) has already started to study the role of demand. In 
their model “the dynamics of an industry is subject to aggregate demand shocks where the 
productivity of a firm's technology evolves stochastically over time”. This strand of literature could 
be extended for example looking at both frictions in finance and aggregate demand shocks at the 
same time. 
 
The  conclusion  of  this  study  is  that  in  majority  of  the  cases  small  firms  indeed  grow  faster  than  
large firms. This is supported both by theoretical and empirical evidence. It can be case that 
sometimes the growth is observed as stochastic, but it would seem that underlying process is indeed 
deterministic as there are profit-maximizing firms that act and make decisions. The actions are not 
random, but sometimes this leads to growth that is observed as random. In other words, this study 
concludes that Tekes should continue to target small and medium size firms with their subsidies. 
                                               
60 The industry should satisfy the assumptions made by Hopenhayn (1992) 
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